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DIA R/S-287540
SECT 01 OF 67540

Set 1-200

ACTION

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J5(02) J3:NMCC NIDS SECDEF(07) SECDEF: USDP(15) ATSD:AE(01)

ASD:PA&E(01) :DIA(20) NMIC

- CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
- CSAF WASHINGTON DC
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TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUHQHQA/COMIPAC HONOLULU HI//IPAC-IC// IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC//DDO-INT-RQ IMMEDIATE
RUAGOTC/CDR501MIGP SEOUL KS PRIORITY
RUAGAAA/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KS//BJ-IS-H// PRIORITY
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
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SECTION 01 OF 02

DIA FOR: DC-1A/CCF, DC-4, DC-4A, JSI-3C, DB-2D, DB-2C1.

SUBJ: IR (U)

THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL

1. (U) CTY: REPUBLIC OF KOREA (KS)
2. (U) TITLE: CIVIL UNREST AND MARTIAL LAW (ML) (U)
3. (U) DTD OF INFO: 800521

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6. (U) SOURCE: [REDACTED]

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7. [REDACTED] SUMMARY: THIS REPORT TRANSMITS SUBSTANTIVE PORTIONS OF A CONVERSATION WITH [REDACTED] PERTAINING TO CIVIL UNREST AND ML.

8A. (U) DETAILS:

-1. [REDACTED] SOURCES SAID THERE IS GROWING ACCEPTANCE THAT THE CIVIL UNREST, RIOTS, ETC IN KWANGJU WILL SPREAD. THEY FEEL THE PRESENT MLC IS TOO INFLEXIBLE AND STEREOTYPED TO FIND A WAY TO DEFUSE THE SITUATION. THEY PREDICTED THAT IN ONE WEEK OR TWO WEEKS AS AN OUTSIDE FIGURE THE PROTESTS AGAINST THE MILITARY IN PARTICULAR AND THE LACK OF POSITIVE ACTION BY THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT IN GENERAL WILL INCITE CIVIL STRIFE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY SIDE. THEY SEEMED CERTAIN THAT THE PROTESTS WOULD FINALLY REACH SEOUL, DESPITE THE LARGE MILITARY FORCE DEPLOYED IN THAT AREA TO HANDLE THE PROBLEM. SOURCE STRESSED THAT THE CHARACTER OF DEMONSTRATIONS WHEN THEY RETURN TO SEOUL, WILL BE DIFFERENT. BEFORE, THE POPULATION DID NOT SUPPORT (AT LEAST OUTWARDLY) THE STUDENT PROTESTS, EVEN THOUGH THE KEY DEMANDS WERE REPRESENTATIVE OF WHAT THE GENERAL PUBLIC WANTS. THEY PREDICTED THAT THIS TIME THE PUBLIC WOULD JOIN THE STUDENTS IN THE STREETS. THEY SAID THE RESPONSE WILL BE OVERWHELMING.

-2. [REDACTED] SOURCES BLAMED THE MILITARY'S OVER-REACTION AS THE PRIME CAUSE FOR THE SOLIDIFICATION WITHIN THE PUBLIC AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. THEY CALCULATED THAT THE ARMY'S STEPS TO REINFORCE THEIR HOLD ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION PLUS THEIR NEGATIVE RESPONSE TO DEMANDS THAT ML BE LIFTED IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WORSENEDED CONFRONTATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. THE DECISION WHICH LEAD TO THE EVENTS OF 17-21 MAY 80 (FULL ML, CLOSURE OF NA, ARREST OF LEADING POLITICIANS, RESIGNATION OF THE CABINET, FORCED CLOSURE OF POLITICAL HEADQUARTERS, CEASATION OF POLITICAL ACTIVITIES, ETC.) BY WHICH ANY HOPE FOR A COMPROMISE SOLUTION WAS LIKELY CRUSHED, IS THE OBVIOUS REASON FOR THIS HARDENING OF THE PUBLIC'S STANCES. SOURCES ASSERTED THAT CHON TU HWAN AND COMPANY, WERE AT THIS POINT CONFUSED BECAUSE

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THEIR STERN FORMULA WAS NOT WORKING AND BEGINNING TO FEEL THREATENED BECAUSE THE CLAMOUR FOR THEIR COLLECTIVE SCALPS WAS GAINING IN MOMENTUM. SOURCES NOTED THAT WITHIN THE ARMY TOO, DOUBT AMONG THE OFFICER CORPS WAS ALSO GROWING. MANY WERE QUESTIONING THE WISDOM AND VALIDITY OF THE ARMY'S CURRENT COURSE WHICH THEY FEEL RUNS DIAMETRICALLY AGAINST THE DEMANDS OF THE KOREAN PUBLIC. QUESTIONS ARE MORE FREQUENTLY ASKED ABOUT THE CORRECTNESS OF THE ARMY'S ML ROLE.

-3. [REDACTED] SOURCES OBSERVED THAT THE EXTENSION OF ML WOULD PROBABLY NOT HAVE BEEN TOO SURPRISING IN ITSELF. GIVEN THE CHARACTER OF THE KOREAN SENIOR OFFICER, AND IN PARTICULAR WHEN YOU CONSIDER THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP WHICH IN SOURCES VIEWS HAS ASSUMED A PATERNAL ROLE, I.E., THINKING THAT THEY KNOW BETTER THAN THE PUBLIC WHAT IS BEST FOR THE PUBLIC THEN THE EXTENSION OF ML WAS NOT TOTALLY UNEXPECTED. HOWEVER THE OTHERS STEPS TAKEN WHICH REPRESENT MILITARY MEDDLING IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS WAS TOTALLY UNJUSTIFIABLE. SOURCES SAID THIS TYPE OF MIS-CALCULATION IS LIKELY TO CAUSE IRRECONCILABLE DISTRUST AND DISRESPECT FOR THE ROK ARMY. THEY EXPLAINED THAT GENERALLY PRIOR TO 12/12 THE ROK ARMY ENJOYED A HIGH REGARD BY THE PUBLIC, BUT NOW AND WHEN THIS SITUATION FINALLY IS CONTROLLED, THE PROBABILITY FOR PROLONG ANIMOSITY TOWARD THE ARMY IS TO BE EXPECTED.

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- CNO WASHINGTON DC
- CSA WASHINGTON DC
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RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC//DDO-INT-RQ IMMEDIATE
RUAGOTC/CDR501MIGP SEOUL KS PRIORITY
RUAGAAA/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KS//BJ-IS-H// PRIORITY
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
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THEY SAID THEY EXPECTED CHON, TU HWAN TO TRY TO EXTRACT A STATEMENT FROM KIM WHICH WOULD BE DESIGNED TO DAMAGE HIS FUTURE CHANCES AS A PRESIDENTIAL HOPEFUL. THEIR COLLECTIVE VIEW WAS THAT KIM IS A VERY STRONG WILLED MAN THAT WILL NOT COOPERATE WITH THE ARMY'S PRESENT LEADERSHIP WHICH IS TRYING TO DIRECTLY INFLUENCE THE ROK POLITICAL SCENE. ALSO THEY INDICATED CHON'S EFFORTS TO FORM A THIRD PARTY HAD GENERALLY FAILED. THEIR ASSESSMENT WAS THAT CHON WOULD NOW ATTEMPT TO ELIMINATE KIM FROM THE DRP AND THEN PLACE A CANDIDATE OF HIS CHOICE AT THE HELM

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OF THAT PARTY, WHO WOULD HAVE THE BACKING OF THE ARMY. THEY EXPRESSED RESOLVE THAT SUCH TACTICS WOULD NOT WORK.

-5. [REDACTED] SOURCES PREDICTED THAT IN THE END, THE PEOPLE WILL HAVE THEIR WAY CONCERNING ML AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A BROADER BASED DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT. THEY FEEL THE ARMY'S LEADERSHIP WILL LOSE AND LIKELY BE OUSTED, IF THEY DO NOT IMMEDIATELY REFRAIN FROM THEIR PRESENT TACTICS. THEY EXPRESSED A WILLINGNESS TO SEE THE PRESENT ARMY LEADERSHIP TO REMAIN IN POWER, PROVIDED THEY STEPPED BACK AND DIRECTED THE ARMY'S EFFORT ALONG MORE TRADITIONAL LINES WHICH MEANS GIVING UP THE ARMY'S ROLE IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS. THEY SAID KNOWING THE PRESENT LEADERSHIPS, THEY ARE SKEPTICAL THAT THEY CAN OR WILL DISENGAGE NOW.

88. [REDACTED] ONE OF THREE SOURCES HAS HAD A REPORTING RELATIONSHIP WITH THIS OFFICE FOR SOMETIME. HE HAS BEEN MOST ACCURATE IN THE PAST. ALL THREE SOURCES ARE RETIRED. NONE OF THE THREE APPEARED TO BE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES. I SENSED THAT WHAT THEY PRESENTED WAS THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION ONLY.

- 9. (U) PROJ NO: N/A
- 10. (U) COLL MGT: CODES
- 11. (U) SPEC INST: NONE. DIRC: NO
- 12. (U) PREP BY: [REDACTED]
- 13. (U) APP BY: [REDACTED]
- 14. (U) REQ EVAL: NO
- 15. (U) ENCL: N/A
- 16. (U) DIST BY ORIG: N/A

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