TEXT OF TELEGRAM 80STATE 166539

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INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 H-01 SS-15 /028 R

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EA:M H ARMACOST
S/S-O:W F DORE

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FM SECSTATE SHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL NIAC IN IMMEDIATE
C ONFIDENTIAL STATE 166539
E.O. 12065: ODS 6/24/86 (RICH, ROBERT G.)
TAGS: S/PM PEPR, KS, US
SUBJECT: DRAFT TEXT FOR WOLFF SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING

1. FOLLOWING IS DRAFT TEXT FOR WOLFF SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING
FOR IMMEDIATE COMMENT.

BEGIN TEXT: MR. CHAIRMAN:

THANK YOU FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO TALK WITH YOU TODAY ABOUT
OUR RELATIONS WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE EFFECT OF
RECENT EVENTS IN THAT COUNTRY.

THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT PARK ON OCTOBER 26, 1979
MARKED THE END OF AN ERA IN KOREAN POLITICS, AN ERA IN
WHICH GREAT ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STRIDES HAD BEEN MADE, BUT
DURING WHICH CENTRALIZED BUREAUCRATIC POLICIES HAD BEEN
INADEQUATELY RECONCILED WITH THE DESIRE OF EXPANDING ELITES
AND AN EDUCATED POPULATION TO HAVE A GREATER DEMOCRATIC
CHOICE AND STRONGER SAFEGUARDS FOR THE EXPRESSION OF DISSENT.

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ING VIEWS.

AS SECRETARY VANCE STATED AS HE LEFT KOREA IN EARLY
NOVEMBER AFTER ATTENDING PRESIDENT PARK'S FUNERAL, THERE
WAS HOPE THAT THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT WOULD BE ABLE TO
MANAGE AN ORDERLY AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSITION UNDER
CIVILIAN RULE IN A MANNER WHICH WOULD BE BROADLY SUPPORTED
BY THE KOREAN PEOPLE. SUBSEQUENTLY, WE WERE PLEASED TO
ENDORSE PUBLICLY THE PROGRAM ANNOUNCED BY PRESIDENT CHOI IN

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DECEMBER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND NEW ELECTIONS TO
PRODUCE A BROADLY-BASED ELECTED GOVERNMENT BY THE SPRING OF
1981. ALTHOUGH THERE WERE UNDERSTANDABLY DIFFERENCES ABOUT
PACE, MECHANISM AND PERSONALITIES WITHIN KOREA, THESE
WERE NOT APPROPRIATE MATTERS ON WHICH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
WOULD HAVE A VIEW.

AS THE DIFFICULT PROCESS CONTINUED FOR MANY MONTHS -- THE
DISMANTLING OF AUTHORITARIAN CONTROLS, ATTEMPTS TO RECONCILE
AND RE-INVOKE DISGRUNTLED ELEMENTS INTO THE MAINSTREAM OF
NATIONAL LIFE, EFFORTS BY POLITICAL PARTIES TO
DECIDE INTERNAL LEADERSHIP COMPETITIONS AND REBUILD THEM-
SELVES FOR A NATIONAL PRESIDENTIAL CONTEST, AND THE BEGIN-
NING OF WORK ON A NEW CONSTITUTION -- IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE
ROAD WAS NOT AN EASY ONE. FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE TRANSI-
TION PROCESS, THERE WERE TWO GREAT DANGERS TO THE ORDERLY
DEVELOPMENT OF AN ELECTED, BROADLY-BASED CIVILIAN GOVERN-
MENT WITHIN A SOCIETY NOT KNOWN FOR POLITICAL TRUST OR COMPROMISE.
EITHER THE STUDENTS AND CERTAIN DISSIDENT GROUPS DEMANDING
IMMEDIATE wholesale CHANGE MIGHT BECOME RASHLY IMPATIENT AND
CREATE A DEGREE OF DISORDER WHICH WOULD EXCEED THE TOLERANCE
OF THE CONSERVATIVE FORCES AND STIMULATE ARMY FEARS ABOUT
SOCIAL WEAKENING IN THE FACE OF AN IMPLACABLE EXTERNAL
MILITARY THREAT, OR A SEGMENT OF THE MILITARY MIGHT BECOME
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SUFFICIENTLY IMPATIENT WITH THE INEFFICIENCIES AND RELATIVE
DISORDEREDNESS OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRATIC
POLITICS TO TAKE MATTERS INTO ITS OWN HANDS TO RESTORE
ORDER AND DISCIPLINE IN THE SOCIETY.

ON THREE OCCASIONS, A GROUP WITHIN THE ARMY TOOK STEPS
WHICH TROUBLED THIS POLITICAL PROGRESSION AND MOST RECENTLY
GAVE IT A SEVERE SETBACK. THE THREE EVENTS WERE THE
INTERNAL ARMY SHAKUP OF MID-DECEMBER, GENERAL CHUN'S
ACQUISITION OF CONTROL OVER THE KOREAN CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY (KCIA) IN APRIL, AND THE EXTENSION OF MARTIAL LAW
AND ASSOCIATED POLITICAL MOVES ON MAY 17. I SHALL BE
GLAD TO ANSWER QUESTIONS ABOUT THE LATTER IN PARTICULAR IF
YOU DESIRE MORE DETAIL. FOR THE PRESENT, LET ME SAY THAT,
IN CONTRARY TO SOME OF THE IMPRESSIONS THE REGIME IN SEOUL
HAS TRIED TO CONVEY, THE UNITED STATES DID NOT KNOW IN
ADVANCE OF ANY OF THOSE THREE ACTIONS NOR DID WE APPROVE.

IN FACT, WE FELT EACH IN A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT WAY POSED
CONSIDERABLE OBSTACLES TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A BROADLY-BASED
CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT OR TO THE MAINTENANCE OF THE CONFIDENCE
AND TRUST OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE. THEY ALSO POSED PROBLEMS
FOR US.

THE EVENTS OF MID-MAY IN PARTICULAR DEALT A CONSIDERABLE SET-

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BACK TO THE BUILDING OF A BROADLY BASED GOVERNMENT IN KOREA. BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY, WE EXPRESSED OUR DEEP CONCERN AND THE VIEW THAT THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE MARTIAL LAW AUTHORITIES WOULD MAKE THE NATION'S PROBLEMS WORSE RATHER THAN BETTER. ALTHOUGH CENSORSHIP, WHICH HAS BEEN STRICTLY IMPOSED WITHIN KOREA SINCE MAY 18 HAD NOT PERMITTED THE KOREAN PUBLIC TO UNDERSTAND FULLY OUR POSITION, WE HAVE BEEN CONCERNED WITH ALL ASPECTS:

--CONCERNED THAT OUTSIDERS MIGHT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

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SITUATION TO MEDDLING THEREIN; AND

--CONCERNED WITH THOSE INSIDE WHO WERE TAKING EXTREME ACTIONS.

THERE IS NO CHANGE IN OUR DEEP SECURITY AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS. INDEED, WE HAVE VITAL INTERESTS IN KOREA AND IN STABILITY IN THE NORTHEAST ASIAN REGION. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, HOWEVER, HAVE MADE THE PURSUIT OF OUR INTERESTS MORE DIFFICULT. LONG-TERM STABILITY IN KOREA WILL, IN OUR VIEW, REQUIRE A PROCESS OF POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION WHICH HAS NOT YET BEEN ACHIEVED BY THE PRESENT REGIME. OUR OWN POSITION OVER TIME WILL BE AFFECTED BY WHETHER THIS ACCOMMODATION TAKES PLACE. HOW THE NECESSARY POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION IS ACCOMPLISHED IS A PROCESS OF WHICH ONLY THE KOREAN PEOPLE THEMSELVES ULTIMATELY CAN BE THE ARBITER. MEANWHILE, OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE REGIME CANNOT BE "BUSINESS AS USUAL," EVEN THOUGH WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER ON MATTERS OF MUCH MUTUAL IMPORTANCE.


RECENTLY, PRESIDENT CHOI ANNOUNCED THAT A NEW CONSTITUTION WOULD BE SUBMITTED TO PUBLIC REFERENDUM BEFORE THE END OF OCTOBER AND THAT ELECTIONS WOULD BE HELD IN THE SPRING OF 1981 FOR A NEW GOVERNMENT TO BE INSTALLED IN JUNE. THESE ARE IMPORTANT GOALS, BUT THE STEPS TO REALIZE THESE GOALS CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

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IN A MEANINGFUL MANNER WILL NOW BE MORE DIFFICULT THAN WAS EARLIER THE CASE. WE BELIEVE ACTIONS OF THE REGIME WILL
SPEAK LOUDER THAN WORDS IN THE COMING MONTHS, AND WE WILL
ADJUST OUR RELATIONS ACCORDINGLY.

NOT ONLY DO WE BELIEVE THAT THE LONG-TERM INTERNAL
STABILITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA IS BEST ATTAINED BY
ESTABLISHMENT OF A POPULARLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT, BUT, IF
THERE IS NOT PROGRESS IN ESTABLISHING A BROADLY-BASED REGIME
SUPPORTED BY THE KOREAN PEOPLE, THEN WE ARE FURTHER CON-
CERNED THAT THE NECESSARY POLITICAL AND PUBLIC SUPPORT IN
THIS COUNTRY FOR MAINTENANCE OF OUR MUTUALLY AND
FUNDAMENTALLY IMPORTANT SECURITY COOPERATION WILL
DANGEROUSLY FLOODE.

FOLLOWING MATERIAL IS PROPOSED ONLY IN RESPONSE TO
QUESTIONS:

Q. KWANGJU

A. I AM GLAD TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS IN A BIT
MORE DETAIL OUR INTERACTION WITH THE EVENTS IN KWANGJU.

MOST OBSERVERS ARE AGREED THAT THE GREATEST EXACERBATING
FACTOR WHICH TURNED STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN KWANGJU INTO
VIRTUAL INSURRECTION WAS THE UNDISCIPLINED AND
SOMETIMES BRUTAL BEHAVIOR OF THE AIRBORNE SPECIAL FORCES
UNIT WHICH ENTERED KWANGJU ON MAY 18-19 IN RESPONSE TO
CONTINUED STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS THERE AFTER THE FULL
EXTENSION OF MARTIAL LAWS AND ARREST OF POLITICAL LEADERS
ON MAY 17. THESE TROOPS ARE NOT UNDER THE COMBINED
ROK-US COMMAND, AND THEREFORE WERE NOT RELEASED IN ANY
MANNER BY GENERAL WICKHAM FOR DUTY IN KWANGJU. THE
SPECIAL FORCES, ALONG WITH SOME OTHER UNITS SUCH AS THE
CAPITAL SECURITY COMMAND, ARE NOT SUBORDINATED TO THE
COMBINED COMMAND EXCEPT IN WARTIME. THE UNITED STATES HAD
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NO ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE OF THIS DEPLOYMENT, NOR DID WE IN
ANY WAY CONDONE THE ACTIVITY OF THESE FORCES.

SUBSEQUENTLY, WE URGED THE KOREAN AUTHORITIES TO EXHAUST
ALL PEACEFUL MEANS IN TRYING TO RESOLVE THE SITUATION IN
KWANGJU, AND, IF THAT WERE NOT SUCCESSFUL, WE URGED THAT
CAREFUL PLANNING BE CONDUCTED TO RESTORE CONTROL OF THE
CITY IN A MANNER WHICH WOULD MINIMIZE INNOCENT CASUALTIES.
DURING THIS PERIOD, THE KOREAN AUTHORITIES REQUESTED THE
UN COMMANDER TO RELEASE CERTAIN UNITS OF THE KOREAN ARMED
FORCES TEMPORARILY FROM THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE
COMBINED COMMAND. THIS WAS DONE, SINCE THE COMBINED
COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITY IS PROPERLY LIMITED TO THE
DEFENSE OF KOREA AGAINST EXTERNAL ATTACK AND THE UNITS
REQUESTED WERE IN RESERVE COMMITMENTS. THERE IS NO
PROPER ROLE FOR THE U.S. COMMANDER TO ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE

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THE DOMESTIC USE OF KOREAN FORCES BY KOREAN NATIONAL AUTHORITIES. EVEN TO ATTEMPT TO DO SO WOULD CAUSE ANY SOVEREIGN NATION TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM A COMBINED COMMAND. IN THE INSTANCE IN QUESTION, HOWEVER, WE REGRET TO SAY THAT IN THE CONTROLLED MEDIA WITHIN KOREA THERE WAS AN INCORRECT IMPRESSION CONVEYED IMPLYING THE POSITIVE APPROVAL OF THE U.N. COMMANDER FOR THE DOMESTIC ACTIONS BEING CONDUCTED. WE PROTESTED THIS MISREPRESENTATION MOST VIGOROUSLY, AND OUR AMBASSADOR UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY AS WIDELY AS POSSIBLE IN KOREA OUR CONCERN FOR THIS DISTORTION.

WITH REGARD TO THE UNITS WITHDRAWN TEMPORARILY FROM THE COMBINED COMMAND, ONE WAS UTILIZED TO RESTORE CONTROL OF THE CITY OF KWANGJU, AN OPERATION WHICH WAS CARRIED OUT WITH VENGEANCE BLOODSHED AND IN FAR MANNER DIFFERENT FROM THE UNFORTUNATE INCIDENTS WHICH HAD PRECIPITATED THE PROBLEM A WEEK BEFORE.

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AT THE HEIGHT OF THE KWANGJU PROBLEM, WE ISSUED A PUBLIC STATEMENT URGING ALL PARTIES TO EXERCISE MAXIMUM RESTRAINT NOTING THE RISK OF Miscalculation BY EXTERNAL FORCES, URGING THE RESUMPTION OF A PROGRAM OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT WHEN CALM WAS RESTORED, AND WARNING AGAINST EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE. BY AGREEMENT WITH THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT, THIS STATEMENT WAS CARRIED IN FULL BY MOST KOREAN MEDIA. IT IS THE ONLY INSTANCE SINCE MAY 17 IN WHICH OUR BALANCED POSITION ON DEVELOPMENTS HAS BEEN CARRIED ON KOREAN PRESS AND RADIO WITHOUT EXPURGATION.

MAY 17

A. WE WERE IN NO WAY INFORMED NOR CONSULTED IN ADVANCE ABOUT THE DECISION TO EXTEND MARTIAL LAW ON MAY 17 AND THE ACTIONS WHICH WERE ASSOCIATED THEREWITH. IN FACT, AT ABOUT THE TIME MILITARY LEADERS WERE MEETING AND DECIDING ON THESE STEPS, AMBASSADOR GLEYSTEEN WAS BEING INFORMED BY A HIGH OFFICIAL OF THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT OF PROJECTED STEPS OF RECONCILIATION WHICH MIGHT HELP TO PREVENT FURTHER STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS. OUR FIRST WORD OF THE STRONG MEASURES BEING TAKEN BY MARTIAL LAW AUTHORITIES CAME FROM A PHONE CALL FROM AN AMERICAN WHO WAS ARRIVING AT EWHWA UNIVERSITY TO ATTEND A CONCERT JUST AS SECURITY FORCES SWEPT ONTO THE CAMPUS TO BREAKUP AN INTER-UNIVERSITY MEETING OF STUDENT LEADERS WHICH WAS CONSIDERING WHAT STEPS TO TAKE FOLLOWING THREE DAYS OF MASSIVE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN SEOUL.

THOSE STUDENT ACTIONS, IN THE CHARGED ATMOSPHERE THEN PREVALENT IN KOREA, CHALLENGED LAW AND ORDER FORCES BEYOND THEIR LIMITS. NEVERTHELESS, THE REACTION WAS CLEARLY
EXCESSIVE. AS A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT, WE COULD HAVE NO PROPER CONCERN AT THE EXTENSION OF MARTIAL LAW ITSELF UNDER THE CHALLENGE OF THOSE MASSIVE DEMONSTRATIONS, OR CONFIDENTIAL

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EVEN OF SUCH MEASURES AS THE TEMPORARY CLOSURE OF THE UNIVERSITIES. HOWEVER, ARRESTS AND ARBITRARY DETENTION OF STUDENT AND POLITICAL LEADERS, INTERFERENCE WITH THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THE FURTHER ACTIONS WHICH INTRUDED THE ARMY DEEPLY INTO THE PROCESSES OF GOVERNMENT CREATED A QUITE DIFFERENT SITUATION A PRONOUNCED SETBACK TO POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT WHICH WE JUDGED WAS DESIRED BY THE KOREAN PEOPLE.

POLITICAL PRISONERS

WE HAVE MADE KNOWN MOST STRONGLY OUR CONCERNS FOR THE ARREST OF POLITICAL LEADERS, TWO OF WHOM WERE AMONG THE PRINCIPAL POTENTIAL CANDIDATES FOR A PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.

WE HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT THOSE ARRESTED HAVE NOT BEEN PERMITTED ANY CONTACT WITH THEIR FAMILIES, LAWYERS, OR ANY OTHER OUTSIDE PARTIES SINCE THEIR ARREST SLIGHTLY MORE THAN ONE MONTH AGO, AND WE ARE SEEKING TO PERSUADE THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT OF THE IMPORTANCE THAT ALL INTERESTED PARTIES BE ABLE TO VERIFY THE HEALTH AND TREATMENT OF THESE INDIVIDUALS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

END TEXT

CHRISTOPHER

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