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Department of State
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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

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STATE 163085 TOSEC 040058

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DRAFTED BY EA/KJR G RICHIAQ
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EA:R C HOLBROOKE
EA:M H ARMACOST
DOD/ISA: N PLATT
PM: D O'DONOHUE
NSC:D GREGG (SUBSTANCE)
S/ : P KREISB RG
S/S :LPBREMER
S/S-O:SS TAPLETON

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IS/FPC/CDR **TRB** Date: **9/13/93**

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TS authority to
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E.O. 12065: ROS-3 6/20/00 (CHRISTOPHER, WARREN)

TAGS: PGOV, PEPR, M&LI, PINT, KS, US

SUBJECT: KOREA FOCUS: INSTRUCTION TO CONVEY U.S. POLICY
CONCERNS TO KOREAN LEADERS

1 (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PRIOR TO YOUR TRAVEL TO KUALA LUMPUR FOR CONSULATIONS
WITH THE SECRETARY ENROUTE TO TOKYO, YOU SHOULD SEEK TO
OBTAIN APPOINTMENTS WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND WITH
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SECRET

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

STATE 163083 TOSEC 040058

GENERAL CHUN DOO HWAN (M-R CHON TU-HWAN) TO CONVEY THE POLICY CONCERNS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AS OUTLINED BELOW. WE NEED YOUR ASSESSMENT OF CHUN UPDATED FROM YOUR JUNE 4 MEETING. THIS IS INTENDED AS A REITERATION AND AMPLIFICATION OF EXISTING U.S. POLICY, AND IS NOT INTENDED TO BREAK NEW GROUND.

FYI: FOR THE SECRETARY: THIS CABLE HAS BEEN COORDINATED AND CLEARED WITH THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT AND THE NSC.

3. OUR OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY:

HAVING CONCLUDED THAT GENERAL CHUN DOO HWAN (M-RICHON TU-HWAN) AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAVE SUCCESSFULLY ESTABLISHED MILITARY CONTROL OF THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT AND THAT THE ARMY IS PRESENTLY UNITED BEHIND THE MEASURES BEING TAKEN, WE HAVE DETERMINED THAT WE MUST AT THE PRESENT STAGE FOCUS OUR INFLUENCE ON MODERATING THE REGIME'S UNACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOR AND MOVING IT TOWARD CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, A REDUCTION OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION, IMPLEMENTATION OF SENSIBLE ECONOMIC POLICIES, AND RESTRAINT IN DEALING WITH POLITICAL OPPONENTS. SIMULTANEOUSLY, WE SEEK TO AVOID OVER-IDENTIFICATION WITH THE PRESENT KOREAN REGIME AND ITS EXCESSES AND INDICATE THAT WE ARE WAITING TO SEE WHETHER ITS ACTIONS WILL WARRANT A FULLY NORMAL US-ROK RELATIONSHIP.

4. SCENARIO FOR IMMEDIATE REPRESENTATIONS:

A) YOU SHOULD COVER ALL THE POINTS CITED IN THE INSTRUCTIONS BELOW PLUS REPRESENTATIONS REGARDING THE IMPRISONED POLITICAL LEADERS (SEE SEPTTEL) WITH GENERAL CHUN. NOTE THAT WE HAVE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED HIS COMMENTS TO YOU DURING YOUR
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OUTGOING
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STATE 163085 TOSEC 040058

MEETING JUNE 4 AND HAVE REVIEWED THE IMPACT OF RECENT EVENT ON THE IMPORTANT RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

B) IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR YOU TO MEET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER PARK ON MONDAY, JUNE 23, AND THUS PROBABLY PRIOR TO YOUR MEETING WITH GENERAL CHUN. BY SEPTEL YOU WILL RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO INFORM THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT MONDAY THAT WE WILL ABSTAIN IN MANILA ON TUESDAY WHEN THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK BRINGS A KOREAN LOAN TO A VOTE.

5. YOUR MEETING WITH GENERAL CHUN:

A) THE SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE OF THIS MEETING WITH CHUN WILL BE TO CONVEY TO HIM OUR IMPLICIT RECOGNITION THAT AS A PRACTICAL MATTER WE MUST DEAL WITH HIM, WHILE LETTING HIM UNDERSTAND THAT HIS CONDUCT WILL DETERMINE THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP AND THAT WE INTEND TO PRESERVE SOME FREEDOM OF ACTION OF OUR OWN OVER COMING MONTHS.

B) YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

--WE HAVE LISTENED TO CHUN'S STATEMENTS ABOUT HIS HOPES OF ESTABLISHING AN EFFECTIVE, CONSTITUTIONAL, ELECTED GOVERNMENT. WE WILL JUDGE THESE INTENTIONS BY THE ACTIONS WHICH TAKE PLACE.

--WE BELIEVE THAT EXTENDED RELIANCE ON REPRESSIVE MEASURES WILL JEOPARDIZE RATHER THAN PROMOTE STABILITY; EXTENDED INVOLVEMENT OF THE MILITARY IN POLITICS WILL DISTRACT THE ARMED FORCES FROM THEIR DEFENSE TASKS AND RISK PUBLIC DISAFFECTION WITH THE ROK ARMY.

--IN HIS MEETING WITH MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, WE UNDERSTAND CHUN SAID THAT THE NEXT GOVERNMENT WOULD BE MORE "LIBERAL" THAN THAT OF PRESIDENT PARK. THIS IS IMPORTANT. IN OUR VIEW, IF THE KOREAN PEOPLE ARE NOT

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ABLE TO SENSE A POLITICAL PROGRESSION AND GROWTH, THE RESULTING INSTABILITY WOULD BRING DANGERS, WHICH BOTH WE AND GENERAL CHUN WISH TO AVOID.

--KOREA'S LONG-TERM ECONOMIC WELL-BEING DEPENDS HEAVILY ON THE CONFIDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL BANKERS, INVESTORS, AND TRADERS. THEY BELIEVE THAT A HEALTHY ECONOMY WITH STABLE GROWTH PROSPECTS CAN ONLY BE FORGED WITH THE UNIFIED SUPPORT OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE.

--WE REMAIN FAITHFUL TO OUR COMMITMENT TO ROK SECURITY AND THIS IS NOT AN ISSUE. AS WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY STATED, WE WILL REEXAMINE IN 1981 THE QUESTION OF FURTHER TROOP WITHDRAWALS. THE ACTIONS OF THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT BETWEEN NOW AND THEN WILL INEVITABLY SHAPE CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES IN THE U.S. TOWARD KOREA. IF A MORE BROADLY BASED SUPPORT IS NOT VISIBLE, THE NECESSARY PUBLIC AND POLITICAL SUPPORT IN THE UNITED STATES FOR OUR PRESENCE IN KOREA COULD BE WEAKENED.

--THE FORTHCOMING CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM SCHEDULED FOR OCTOBER CAN BE AN IMPORTANT BENCHMARK FOR RESTORING CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, IF THE REFERENDUM IS CONDUCTED UNDER MARTIAL LAW THE MANDATE WILL BE VIEWED AS GRAVELY FLAWED BOTH INTERNATIONALLY AND DOMESTICALLY.

--EFFORTS TO MISREPRESENT U.S. POLICIES OR ASSOCIATE US WITH ACTIONS WHICH ARE PURELY THE DECISION OF THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT CREATE SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR US AND DIMINISH OUR ABILITY TO COOPERATE FOR MUTUAL INTERESTS. WE ARE ALSO DISTURBED BY INDICATIONS THAT SOME KOREAN LEADERS MAY BE STIMULATING ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENTS. SUCH ACTIONS ARE

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

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INCONSISTENT WITH AND RAISE SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT THE INTIMATE SECURITY COOPERATION WHICH UP TO NOW HAS BEEN EXEMPLIFIED BY THE US-ROK JOINT COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS.

C) IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE FUNDAMENTAL OUTLINE OF OUR POSITION AND THE DANGERS WE PERCEIVE OVER THE MID-TERM IF CERTAIN DEVELOPMENTS SHOULD OCCUR OR CONTINUE, YOU SHOULD THEN STATE TO GENERAL CHUN THAT THERE ARE TWO MATTERS INVOLVING IMMEDIATE ISSUES ON WHICH YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO MAKE KNOWN THE VIEWS AND REQUESTS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT: THE QUESTION OF THE POLITICAL LEADERS AND OTHERS WHO HAVE BEEN IMPRISONED SINCE MAY 17, AND THE LINKAGE OF THE COMBINED FORCES COMMAND WITH DOMESTIC POLITICAL STRUCTURES. OF

THESE TWO, THE ISSUE OF THE ARRESTED POLITICAL LEADERS IS BY FAR THE MOST IMPORTANT, SO YOU SHOULD NOTE YOU WILL DISPOSE OF THE CFC ISSUE FIRST:

--WE FIND THE APPOINTMENT OF THE DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE COMBINED FORCES COMMAND (CFC) SIMULTANEOUSLY TO A SEAT ON THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY MEASURES A MOST UNFORTUNATE LINKAGE OF THE ROK-US JOINT COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS WITH KOREAN DOMESTIC POLITICS. THEREFORE, WE MUST FORMALLY REQUEST THAT CFC DEPUTY COMMANDER GENERAL PAIK EITHER BE REMOVED FROM THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OR RELIEVED OF HIS CFC RESPONSIBILITIES.

direct intervention
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--IMPRISONED POLITICAL LEADERS (SEE SEPTEL). CHRISTOPHER

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