

-7 DEC 79Z 08 48

001118



Department of State

INCOMING ACTION COPY

PAGE 01 ACTION #005-06

SEOUL 18545-070809Z

COPY 1 OF 13 COPIES

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 7001 W

-----094595 070814Z /21

D 070752Z DEC 79
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2672

SECRET SEOUL 18545

12/7/79

Class. A - Portion removed;
transferred to O/FADRC
Class. B - Transferred to O/FADRC
with additional access
controlled by S/S
Class. C - Portion and custody
retained by S/S
Reviewed by: [Signature]
Date: [Signature]

FOR EA HOLBROOKE FROM GLEYSTEN

E.O. 12065 RDS-3 12/7/90 (GLEYSTEN, H.M.) DR-M
TAGSI PGOV, PEPR, KS, US

SUBJECT: KOREA FOCUS - NUDGING ROK POLITICAL LEADERS

REF: STATE 312340 Holbrooke cable

- (S) ENTIRE TEXT.
- BEFORE COMMENTING ON YOUR PROPOSED TACTIC OF DEALING WITH THE OPPOSITION (REFTEL), LET ME REVIEW WHAT WE HAVE DONE SO FAR. THE SECRETARY PROMISED PRESIDENT CHOI WE WOULD ENCOURAGE MODERATION IN OUR DEALINGS WITH THE OPPOSITION/DISSIDENT COMMUNITY. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER WE BEGAN TO DO SO. MY DISCUSSIONS WITH YUN PO SUN, KIM YONG SAM, AND OTHERS WERE ONLY THE MOST PROMINENT OF MANY SIMILAR APPROACHES BY MY COLLEAGUES. BEFORE APPROACHING THE OPPOSITION AND DISSIDENTS, WE TOLD THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY BUREAUCRACY WHAT WE WERE GOING TO DO, AND AFTER DOING IT, WE REPORTED BACK ON THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE DISCUSSIONS.

Gleysten critique of dissidents

3. ON THE GOVERNMENT SIDE WE HAVE FOUND ALMOST UNIFORM
SECRET

EXCISE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

18 FPC/CDR TRB Date 9/13/93

() RELEASE	DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:
(X) EXCISE	DECLASSIFY	EO Citations
() DENY	IN PART	
() DELETE	Non-Responsive Info	TS authority to
FOIA Exemptions	B1	() S or () C OADR
RA Exemptions		() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C OADR

NON-SECRET



Department of State
SECRET

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 02

SEOUL 18545 070809Z

NON-SECRET

APPRECIATION FOR OUR EFFORTS DIRECTED AT THE OPPOSITION WITH ONE EXCEPTION WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF A SEPTEL. IN FACT, WERE IT NOT FOR THOSE EFFORTS, I SUSPECT WE WOULD HAVE RUN INTO A BUZZ SAW OF HYPERSENSITIVITY AMONG CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OFFICIALS TO THE BLUNT ADVICE WE HAVE GIVEN THEM.

4. THE IMPACT ON THE OTHER SIDE HAS OBVIOUSLY BEEN LESS SATISFACTORY, AND WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO STOP SOME CONTINUING CHALLENGES TO THE MARTIAL LAW AUTHORITIES.

BIA5

SOME OTHER RELIGIOUS LEADERS SEEM PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH US, HOWEVER, NONE OF THEM CAN CONTROL THE EXTREMISTS. THEY ARE, MOREOVER, UNEASY ABOUT ENTERING THE FRAY OUT OF FEAR THAT THE MARTIAL LAW AUTHORITIES WILL COMPLICATE THE CAUSE OF MODERATION BY NOT SHOWING SUFFICIENT TOLERANCE. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT THE YUN POSUN'S HAVE REJECTED OUR VIEWS.

5. THUS, WE HAVE BEEN DOING SOMETHING WHICH RESEMBLES YOUR REFTEL PROPOSAL. IF WE WERE TO GO BEYOND IT WITH AN EXPLICIT MESSAGE AND CLEAR WARNING TO THE DISSIDENTS, I THINK WE WOULD GET OURSELVES IN A LOT OF TROUBLE WITHOUT ACCOMPLISHING MUCH MORE THAN WE ARE NOW. I AM FAIRLY CERTAIN THAT OUR FRIENDS SUCH AS CARDINAL KIM AND KIM KWAN SUK WOULD BE UNWILLING TO CONVEY THE WARNING TO THEIR EXTREMIST COLLEAGUES. EVEN IF THEY DID, THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO CONTROL THE EXTREMISTS. THE LATTER, AS I SAID IN MY ASSESSMENT, ARE SO HOSTILE TO THE GOVERNMENT THAT NOTHING BUT A CLEAN SWEEP WILL SATISFY THEM. TOO MANY OF THEM HAVE BECOME POLITICIZED THROUGH THEIR LONG CONFRONTATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT TO THE POINT WHERE THEY DO NOT WISH TO RETURN TO THE QUIET RANKS OF MINISTERS OF THE

SECRET

SECRET



Department of State
SECRET

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 03

SEOUL 18545 070809Z

GOSPEL. I AM ALSO SURE THAT THEY WOULD IMMEDIATELY CON-
VEY KNOWLEDGE OF OUR WARNING BACK TO HUMAN RIGHTS CIRCLES
IN THE U.S. IN DISTORTED WAYS THAT MIGHT BE VERY UNFOR-
TUNATE. FINALLY, I FEAR THAT A FEW OF THEM MIGHT DO WHAT
THEY HAVE THREATENED TO DO; I.E., STIMULATE ANTI-AMERICAN
FEELING IN THEIR CIRCLES.

6. I REGRET THAT I VOTE NEGATIVELY ON YOUR CONSTRUCTIVE
EFFORT TO HELP US COPE WITH ONE OF OUR MOST DISTURBING
PROBLEMS. GLEYSTEN

SECRET

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NON-SECRET