

E1686

TEXT OF TELEGRAM BOSEOUL 006663

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SECRET

PAGE 01 SEUL 06663 261030Z
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W
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O 261020Z MAY 80
FM AMEMBASSY SEUL
TO SECRETARY WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6568

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EXDTS****

E.O. 12958: RDS-1 5/26/00 (GLEYSTEN, W.H.) OR-M
TAGS: PGOV, MILI, PINT, PINS, KS, US
SUBJECT: MAY 26 MEETING WITH BLUE HOUSE SYG CHOI

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.
2. NOTE: SUBSEQUENT TO THE CONVERSATION RECORDED BELOW, WE RECEIVED RELIABLE INDICATIONS THAT A MILITARY OPERATION TO RE-OCCUPY KWANGJU MAY BEGIN AROUND MIDNIGHT TONIGHT.
3. FOLLOWING UP A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION LAST NIGHT, I MET BRIEFLY WITH BLUE HOUSE SYG KWANG SOO CHOI (M-R: CH'OE KWANG-SU) THIS MORNING, MAY 26. AFTER DESCRIBING THE DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION IN KWANGJU AND EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS PEACEFULLY, CHOI SAID THAT THE

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4. I TOLD CHOI THAT WE HAD PASSED MESSAGES TO THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES VIA GENERAL WICKHAM / URGING THAT ANY MILITARY ACTION TAKEN IN KWANGJU BE DONE IN WAYS TO MINIMIZE THE LOSS OF LIFE AND HOLD DOWN THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE POLITICALLY ALIENATED BY REPRESSIVE

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR TRB Date: 9/13/93 1121

EXCISE

- () RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
- (X) EXCISE (X) DECLASSIFY IN PART
- () DENY
- () DELETE Non-Responsive Info
- FOIA Exemptions B1
- PA Exemptions

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations _____
TS authority to:
CLASSIFY as S or () C OADR
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C OADR

Cat. A - Content approved; transferred to O-FA/DRC
 Cat. B - Transferred to O-FA/DRC with additional access controlled by S/S
 Cat. C - Caption and custody retained by S/S
 Reviewed by: Elijah Kelly Jr.
 Date: 4-28-93 19__

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S/S

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Justification for intervention

ACTION. WE WERE NOT TELLING THE GOVERNMENT TO REFRAIN FROM MILITARY ACTION SINCE WE RECOGNIZED THE DANGERS OF AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF LAWLESSNESS IN KWANGJU; WE WERE, HOWEVER, URGING THAT ALL REALISTIC NON-MILITARY OPTIONS BE EXHAUSTED AND THAT ANY MILITARY OPERATIONS BE CARRIED OUT WITH THE GREATEST CARE. I ADDED QUITE FRANKLY THAT I WAS EXTREMELY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PAST BEHAVIOR OF THE SPECIAL FORCES AND HOPED THEY WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN ANY RECAPTURE OPERATION (THE PROBABILITY IS THAT THEY WILL BE EMPLOYED).

5. I EXPLAINED THAT WE HAD BEEN VERY BOTHERED BY BROADCASTS IN THE KWANGJU AREA ASSERTING THAT GENERAL WICKHAM HAD NOT ONLY AUTHORIZED THE SHIFT OF TROOPS TO KWANGJU BUT HAD ALSO ENCOURAGED THE MOVEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES TO CONTROL THE CITY. WE HAD TOLD THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES THAT SUCH CRUDE EFFORTS TO SHIFT THE BLAME TO US WERE UNACCEPTABLE AND IF CONTINUED, WOULD NECESSITATE A FIRM U.S. DENIAL. THE MILITARY SEEMED TO APPRECIATE THE PROBLEM, BUT WE WERE STILL NOT SURE WHETHER CORRECTIVE ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN. I NOTED THAT SECRETARY MUSKIE WAS PERSONALLY CONCERNED AND I EMPHASIZED THAT NOTHING COULD BE WORSE THAN TO HAVE A SIZEABLE ANTI-AMERICAN MOVEMENT ON TOP OF ALL THE OTHER PROBLEMS IN CHOLLA PROVINCE.

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CHOI SAID

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6. IN CONCLUSION, I REMINDED CHOI THAT THE ULTIMATE CAUSE IN MY OPINION, OF THE PROBLEMS IN KWANGJU WAS POLITICAL ACTION TAKEN IN SEOUL. UNLESS THERE COULD BE SOME POSITIVE POLITICAL SIGNAL GIVEN TO PEOPLE, KOREA'S SITUATION COULD DETERIORATE STILL FURTHER WITH MOST ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES FOR ALL OF US. I SAID SOME OF THE MILITARY OFFICERS SEEMED TO APPRECIATE THIS POINT BUT SEVERAL CRUCIAL INDIVIDUALS DID NOT. THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE BROUGHT AROUND TO UNDERSTAND.

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