

ADP452
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 SEOUL 18742 01 OF 02 121702Z
ACTION EA-12

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11
/066 W

-----002146 121807Z /51/12

P 120921Z DEC 79

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2980
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SEOUL 18742

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT PARA 4 AND 5)

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 12/11/89 (CLARK, WILLIAM) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, PGOV, KS
SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH NDP ASSEMBLYMEN

REF: SEUL 18636

1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: I LUNCHEd WITH FOUR SENIOR NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY (NDP) ASSEMBLYMEN DECEMBER 11, WHOSE MAJOR CONCERNS WERE THAT THE NEW CABINET WOULD MERELY BE RESHUFFLE OF PRESIDENT PARK LOYALISTS; THAT A BELIEVABLE TIMETABLE FOR THE TRANSFER OF POWER FROM THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE FIRMLY ESTABLISHED; THAT NORTH KOREA MIGHT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION; AND THAT GENERAL CHONG SUNG-HWA'S COMMENTS ABOUT KIM TAE-CHUNG MEANT THAT HIS POLITICAL RIGHTS WOULD NOT BE RESTORED. ONE OF THE TWO NDP KIMS (THEY WERE CAREFUL NOT TO TAKE SIDES) WILL COMPETE FOR THE PRESIDENCY WITH KIM JONG-PIL (KIM CHONG-P'IL). WHILE THEY SEEMED TO BE A RELATIVELY REALISTIC AND PATIENT GROUP OF MEN, THEY SAW SEVERAL DANGER POINTS WHICH COULD LEAD TO DEMONSTRATIONS, ESPECIALLY BY STUDENTS. I MADE THE POINTS I HAD MADE EARLIER TO KIM
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 SEOUL 18742 01 OF 02 121702Z

YONG-SAM (REFTEL), EMPHASIZED THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR COUNSELLING MODERATION AND PATIENCE WITHIN THE OPPOSITION, AND URGED NDP EFFORTS TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING GENERAL CHONG. END SUMMARY.

3. I HAD LUNCH AT POLCOUNS RESIDENCE DECEMBER 11 WITH FOUR NDP ASSEMBLYMEN -- EX-FLOOR LEADER SONG WON-YONG; VICE PRESIDENT YI KI-TAEK; SECRETARY GENERAL PAK HAN-SANG; AND EX-SPOKESMAN KIM SU-HAN. THE FOUR SEEMED

12/12/79

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPC/CDR TRB Date: 9/13/93
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only: _____
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations _____
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART	_____ TS authority to _____
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as <input type="checkbox"/> S or <input type="checkbox"/> C OADR
FOIA Exemptions _____		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to <input type="checkbox"/> S or <input type="checkbox"/> C OADR
PA Exemptions _____		

KEYS' responsibility for counselling moderation and patience w/ in the oppositi

COMFORTABLE WITH EACH OTHER AND WITH AN AMERICAN INTERPRETER.


4. THE NEW CABINET, WHICH WILL BE ANNOUNCED DECEMBER 13, WAS A MATTER OF GENUINE CONCERN. PAK HAN-SANG, WHO WAS BY FAR THE MOST STRIDENT GUEST, ATTACKED IT AS JUST A RE-ARRANGEMENT OF "PRESIDENT PARK'S PUPPETS", WITH EX-NUMBER TWO MAN CHOI KYU-HAH (CH"OE KYU-HA) MOVING UP TO THE NUMBER ONE SPOT, SHIN HYON-HWACK (SIN HYONG-HWAK) MOVING UP FROM NUMBER THREE MAN TO NUMBER TWO MAN, AND MANY OF THE LATE PRESIDENT'S OLD CRONIES BEING RETAINED. YI KI-TAEK SAID MORE MODERATELY THAT THE NDP WAS RIGHTLY CRITICIZED IN THE PAST FOR OPPOSING THE GOVERNMENT JUST FOR THE SAKE OF OPPOSITION, BUT THE PARTY HAD CHANGED SINCE PARK'S ASSASSINATION. "WE DON'T WANT TO BLINDLY OPPOSE THE CHOI GOVERNMENT, BUT IF THE CABINET IS AS BAD AS EVERYONE SAYS, THERE'S GOING TO BE TROUBLE." SONG WON-YONG SAID THE NDP COULD ACCEPT THE NEW ECONOMIC TEAM, BUT MOVING PAK YONG-SU FROM THE UNIFICATION BOARD (THE ORGANIZATION WHICH HAD CREATED YUSHIN) TO HOME AFFAIRS AS PREDICTED WILL "INCITE THE WRATH OF THE PEOPLE".

5. IN YI KI-TAEK'S VIEW, ESTABLISHING A BELIEVABLE POLITICAL SCHEDULE WAS CRITICAL. HE ADDED THAT GENERAL CHONG SUNG-HWA'S STATEMENT ABOUT KIM TAE-CHUNG AND KIM CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 SEOUL 18742 01 OF 02 121702Z

YONG-SAM BEING "SOCIALISTS OR COMMUNISTS" HAD CAUSED REAL AGONY IN THE NDP. SONG ASKED IF I THOUGHT THAT KIM TAE-CHUNG'S POLITICAL RIGHTS WOULD BE RESTORED, SAYING, AS DID YI KI-TAEK, THAT THERE WOULD BE "TREMENDOUS PROBLEMS" IF THEY WERE NOT. REGARDING GENERAL CHONG, I SAID I HAD TOLD KIM YONG-SAM LAST WEEK THAT THE MARTIAL LAW COMMANDER WAS A SOLDIER AND UNUSED TO HAVING HIS WISHES DISOBEYED. HE ALSO DOUBTLESS HAS WORRIES ABOUT THE NDP AND ITS POSSIBLE CANDIDATES, FEARING THAT THE OPPOSITION MIGHT ADOPT A SOFT LINE TOWARD THE NORTH OR OPPOSE THE MILITARY BUDGET SHOULD THE PARTY COME TO POWER. I ADDED THAT I FOUND GENERAL CHONG TO BE AN INTELLIGENT MAN AND THE OPPOSITION MUST ACCEPT HIM AS A FACT OF LIFE AND WORK TO DISPEL ANY DOUBTS HE MAY HAVE ABOUT IT BY TALKING TO HIM AND OTHERS IN THE GOVERNMENT. I ENDED BY EXPRESSING HOPE THAT THE RESTORATION OF KIM TAE-CHUNG'S POLITICAL RIGHTS WOULD NOT BE A PROBLEM, BUT SAID FRANKLY I DID NOT KNOW THE ANSWER TO SONG'S QUESTION.

6. I ASKED THE GROUP HOW THEY SAW KIM TAE-CHUNG'S FUTURE ROLE IN THE PARTY. SONG SAID IF KIM TAE-CHUNG'S RIGHTS ARE RESTORED THERE WILL BE A STRONG CONTEST BETWEEN THE KIMS FOR THE RIGHT TO BE THE PARTY'S PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. "WE CAN STAND THAT SORT OF COMPETITION, BUT THE DRP WOULD SPLIT OVER IT." THE MAIN ISSUE IS THAT KIM



ADP780
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 SEOUL 18742 02 OF 02 121003Z
ACTION EA-12

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11
/066 W

-----130998 121214Z /12

P 120921Z DEC 79
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2981
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 SEOUL 18742

7. KIM SU-HAN (WHO APPEARED THE MOST CONSERVATIVE) SAID THE PEOPLE SUPPORT THE CHOI GOVERNMENT. "WE WILL BE PATIENT BECAUSE WE WANT TO MOVE TO THE FOURTH REPUBLIC WITH NO COMMOTION." HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT IF KIM IL-SONG ATTACKS THE POLITICAL TIMETABLE WILL MEAN NOTHING AND ASKED MY VIEW OF THE CHANCES FOR AN ATTACK FROM THE NORTH. (THE GROUP FOUND THIS QUESTION OF THE GREATEST INTEREST AND SONG WON-YONG, ON THE POINT OF LEAVING, STAYED TO HEAR MY ANSWER.) I TOLD THEM I THOUGHT THE CHANCES OF AN ATTACK FROM THE NORTH AT PRESENT WERE SLIGHT. THE NORTH SEES THE ROK AND THE U.S. AS STRONG AND UNITED. THIS WAS UNDERLINED BY OUR MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC ACTIONS THE DAY AFTER PARK'S DEATH. IF CHAOS DEVELOPED IN THE SOUTH, HOWEVER, I COULD NOT RULE OUT NORTH KOREAN MILITARY INTERVENTION.

*slight chance of
NK invasion
gleysten tells
opposite*

8. COMMENT... WITH THE EXCEPTION OF PAK HAN-SANG, THESE ASSEMBLYMEN SEEMED SOMEWHAT RECEPTIVE TO MY ARGUMENTS THAT THEY HAD TO BE REALISTIC ABOUT THE DEGREE OF LIBERALIZATION THAT COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED IN A SHORT TIME. PARTICULARLY SINCE POWER WAS STILL IN THE HANDS OF CONSERVATIVE PEOPLE WHO DID NOT TRUST THE OPPOSITION OR TAKE KINDLY TO CRITICISM. THEY SEEMED READY TO BE CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 SEOUL 18742 02 OF 02 121003Z

"PATIENT" FOR AWHILE BUT OBVIOUSLY HAVE IN MIND A RATHER SHORT PERIOD. OF ALL MY POINTS, THEY WERE MOST RESPONSIVE TO MY COMMENTS ON GENERAL CHONG AND THE NEED TO CONVINCHE HIM AND OTHERS IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NDP'S CONCERN FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTENTION TO ACT RESPONSIBLY IN THIS AREA. ALL WERE CAREFUL NOT TO CHOOSE BETWEEN KIM YONG-SAM AND KIM TAE-CHUNG. GLEYSTEN

