

E1759

PO90 005-0060

12 JUN 80Z 11 13

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

SECRET

N00303.

PAGE 01 ACTION NODS-00 SEOUL 07559 121033Z COPY 1 OF 7 COPIES

INFO OCT-01 AOS-00 /001 W031174 121047Z /21

O 120917Z JUN 80 FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7027

SECRET SEOUL 07559

NODIS

CHEROKEE

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLBROOKE FROM GLEYSTEN

NODIS REVIEW

Cat. A - Caption removed; transferred to O/FADRC

Cat. B - Transferred to O/FADRC with additional access controlled by S/S

Cat. C - Caption and custody retained by S/S

Entered by: EK Elijah Kelly Jr.

Date: 4-28-93 19__

E.O. 120651 NDS-3 6/12/80 (GLEYSTEN, W.H.) OR-M
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, K9
SUBJECT: KOREA FOCUS; CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS

REF: STATE 154469

- (S) ENTIRE TEXT.
- THE FOLLOWING ARE MY REACTIONS TO THE SUGGESTIONS OF LEE HAMILTON/MILICENT FENWICK (HEFTEL).
- SENSE OF CONGRESS RESOLUTION: I AM NOT IN FAVOR OF THIS IDEA, BUT I HAVE AN ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTION. MY IMPRESSION IS THAT THE CONGRESS HAS RARELY PASSED RESOLUTIONS OF THIS KIND AND THAT SOUTH KOREANS WOULD FEEL THEY HAD AGAIN BEEN SINGLED OUT FOR THE KIND OF PUBLIC WHIPPING THAT WE WOULD NOT BE WILLING TO GIVE ISRAEL, EGYPT, THE PRC, YUGOSLAVIA, OR TANZANIA. LARGE NUMBERS OF KOREANS--NOT JUST THE GENERALS WHO HAVE SET BACK POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION--WOULD RESENT SUCH DISCRIMINATION. IN ANY EVENT, I THINK A HIGHLY PUBLIC ACT WOULD GET THE GENERALS' BACKS UP

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR

TRB Date 9/13/93

RELEASE
 EXCISE
 DENY
 DELETE Non-Responsive Info

FOIA Exemptions
 PA Exemptions

MR Cases Only: EO Citations

TS authority to:
 CLASSIFY as
 DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C OADR
 S or () C OADR

031174

7170 88

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NODIS

NON-CLASSIFIED



Department of State INCOMING TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 SEOUL 07559 121033Z

RATHER THAN HELP MATTERS. IT WOULD ALSO STIMULATE UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS IN OPPOSITION AND DISSIDENT CIRCLES HERE. A REFERENCE TO THE RELEASE OF KIM DAE JUNG (MR. KIM TAE-CHUNG) AND OTHER ARRESTED LEADERS WOULD ESTABLISH A CONGRESSIONAL GOAL WHICH WE IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH COULD NOT ACCOMPLISH.

4. AT THE SAME TIME I WELCOME HAMILTON'S WILLINGNESS TO HELP AND THE CONGRESS COULD BE OF CONSIDERABLE ASSISTANCE. INSTEAD OF RESOLUTIONS, I RECOMMEND THAT CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS WRITE LETTERS TO PRESIDENT CHOI MAKING THE POINTS PROPOSED BY HAMILTON. IN A LETTER REFERENCES TO KIM DAE JUNG AND ARRESTED LEADERS WOULD BE APPROPRIATE. THE LETTERS WOULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE IF THEY CAME FROM SENIOR MEMBERS AND WERE CO-SIGNED BY THE LARGEST POSSIBLE GROUP OF REPRESENTATIVE MEMBERS OF BOTH PARTIES AND BOTH HOUSES.

5. NORTH KOREAN POLICY: I AM EXTREMELY NEGATIVE ABOUT MILICENT PENWICK'S SUGGESTION THAT WE TELL CHUN DOU HWAN (MR. CHON TU-HWAN) THAT IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES WE MIGHT FIND IT NECESSARY TO REVIEW OUR LONG STANDING REFUSAL TO TALK TO THE NORTH WITHOUT THE ROK PRESENT IN ORDER TO PROTECT OUR INTERESTS ON THE PENINSULA. YOU HAVE ALREADY MADE SOME OF THE KEY POINTS IN YOUR DISCUSSION WITH HER. YOU MIGHT WANT TO TELL HER THAT I TOO TOYED WITH THE SAME THOUGHT, BUT REJECTED IT BECAUSE IT WOULD HAVE NO POSITIVE BENEFIT AND WOULD AMOUNT TO GIVING OURSELVES THE TEMPORARY PLEASURE OF A PUNITIVE ACTION. I AM SURE IT WOULD NOT SCARE THE GENERALS INTO DEMOCRACY. ON THE CONTRARY, THE MOST LIKELY RESULT WOULD BE TO CREATE MORE FEELINGS OF PARANOIA AMONG THEM AND TO INHIBIT FURTHER OUR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THEM IN LIBERAL DIRECTIONS.

SECRET

03145087000

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S



Department of State INCOMING TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 SEUL 07559 121433Z

6. AT SOME POINT I WILL BE SENDING IN SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT OUR POLICY TOWARDS NORTH KOREA OF A LONGER RANGE, NON-PUNITIVE NATURE, GLEYSTEN

SECRET

0315087030