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E.O. 12065:RDS-3 3/12/00 (GLEYSTEEN, YET ANOTHER ASSESSMENT OF ROK STABLE TOWN AND DE ELLEN KETTY JE TAGS: PGOV, PINT, PINS, MILI, KS POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Cat. C - Caption and custody retained by S/S

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(Cat A) Caption removed;

with additional access controlled by S/S

(S) ENTIRE TEXT.

BEGIN SUMMARY: THE PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY AND DE-MOCRATIC-MINDEDNESS IN THE ROK DURING 1980 ARE FAIR, AL-THOUGH THE GOING WILL GET ROUGHER RATHER THAN EASIER AS THE THE STUDENTS COULD PROVE SPOILERS, BUT YEAR CHURNS ON. CIVIL UNREST WILL PROBABLY BE HELD IN CHECK. HAVE NOT FOUND THEIR BALANCE IN THE FACE OF A GOVERNMENT WHICH IS RELAXING RESTRICTIONS, WHILE POLITICIANS ARE BE-HAVING CIRCUMSPECTLY FOR FEAR OF PROVOKING THE MILITARY AND DESTROYING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR POLITICAL PROGRESS. FOR THE SHORT TERM WORKERS MAY TAKE A TEMPORARY REDUCTION IN REAL INCOME RATHER THAN RESORT TO STRIDENT DEMANUS AS THE GOVERNO A RESPONSE TO DEPRESSED ECONOMIC CONDITIONS. MENT IS OPENATING WITH ENOUGH COMPETENCE TO COPE WITH THE NATION'S PRUBLEMS -- AT LEAST TO THE POINT OF NUT PHO-VIDING A CONVENIENT EXCUSE FOR THUSE WHO MIGHT WISH TO TERMINATE ITS PROGRAM OF "ONDERLY DEMUCHATIZATION".

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PAGE 82

SECUL 23239 01 OF 05 1506432

J. THE ODDS OF AN EARLY MILITARY COUP SEEM TO HAVE RECEDED -- IN PART BECAUSE MILITARY OFFICERS ARE COMING TO
UNDERSTAND THE COMPLEXITY OF KOREA'S ECONOMY, THE DELICACY
OF KOREA'S FOREIGN RELATIONSHIPS, AND THE GUITE APPARENT
CONSENSUS OF MOST KOREANS OPPOSING A DIRECT MILITARY HOLE
IN POLITICS. THE THREAT OF EARLY INTERNECINE STRIFE WITHIN THE ROK ARMY DOES NOT SEEM AS GREAT AS A FEW WEEKS AGO-LARGELY BECAUSE OF THE SUBSTANTIAL SHIFT OF KEY TROOP
COMMANDERS AND AWARENESS THAT THE USG WOULD NOT SUPPORT AN
EFFORT TO UPSET THE CURRENT EQUILIBRIUM.

4. WITHIN THE CONTROL STRUCTURE A PARTICULARLY HOW. ISOME PHENOMENON IS THE GREAT POWER OF CHUN DOO HWAN, WHI HAS SPREAD HIS INTELLIGENCE SECURITY NET THROUGHOUT THE 11LI—TARY STRUCTURE, AND, DESPITE FLAT ASSURANCES AGAINST INVOLVING HIMSELF IN POLITICS (AS HE DEFINES POLITICS), VOLVING HIMSELF IN POLITICS (AS HE DEFINES POLITICS), GIVES THE IMPRESSION OF A MAN BIDING HIS TIME TO TAKE OVER CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT EITHER DIRECTLY ON BEHIND SUME FACADE. SHOULD HE TRY TO EXTEND HIS FORMAL POWER TO INSCREADED THE KCIA OR MANIPULATE THE STRUCTURING OF THE NEXT ELECTIONS, HE COULD PRECIPITATE DANGEROUS PUBLIC UNHEST AND REACTIVATE STRESSES WITHIN THE ROK ARMY TO EVEN HIS DECEMBER 12 CULLABORATORS MIGHT TURN ON HIM.

5. ANOTHER SOURCE OF SERIOUS CONCERN IS THE DEPTH OF DISTRUST OF THE SENIOR MILITARY LEADERSHIP TOWARD KIM YONG SAM AND KIM TAE CHUNG, SINCE THIS CANNOT BE ERASED IN THE SHORT TIME BEFORE ELECTIONS, THE MILITARY WILL BE TEMPTED TO JOIN A BUREAUCRATIC/BUSINESS COALITION TO PREJUDICE THE CONTEST AND POSSIBLY TO REFUSE TO ACCEPT THE JUDICE THE CONTEST AND POSSIBLY TO REFUSE TO ACCEPT THE RESULTS IF THE NOP SHOULD HIM. FURTURATELY, SOME SENIOR OFFICERS RECOGNIZE THAT THE ARMY WOULD JEOPARDIZE ITS SECRET

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### Department of State

## INCOMING

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PAGE 93

SECUL 93439 01 OF 05 1506432

POPULAR SUPPORT IF IT WERE TO ENGAGE IN CRUDE MANIPULATION BEFORE AN ELECTION OR ATTEMPT TO TOPPLE A POPULARLY ELECTED NOP-LED GOVERNMENT -- AT LEAST BEFORE AT HAD BLOTTED ITS COPYBOOK.

B. HOPEFULLY PRESIDENT CHOI AND HIS GOVERNMENT WILL BE ABLE TO CARRY THROUGH CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT AND DIRECT ELECTIONS MORE OR LESS AS PLANNED WITH A RESULTING GOVERNMENT THAT IS SOMEWHAT MORE LIBERAL THAN THE PREVIOUS ONE. CONCEIVABLY THE CONTEST WILL BE A STRAIGHTFURNARD ONE BETWEEN THE NOP AND ORP KIMS, BUT GIVEN THE NUMBER OF BUREAUCRATS, BUSINESSMEN, AND SOLDIERS WITH AN INTEREST IN THE OUTCOME, THEY MAY TRY TO INJECT OTHER PLAYERS IN THE RACE AND GIVE THEM SPECIAL ADVANTAGES. ALTHOUG SUCH A MOVE MIGHT DISTURB ROUSSEAU DEMUCRATS, WE SHOULD NOT JUMP TO THE CONCLUSION THAT IT MOULD SIGNAL THE RETURN OF YUSHIN OR BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE KOREAN PUBLIC. END

7. THE JUXTAPOSITION IN LOCAL MEDIA OF NEWS ABOUT KIM
TAE CHUNG'S RECENT RETURN TO POLITICS AND CHUN DOO HWAN'S
PROMOTION TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL CUNJURES UP CONTRASTING
PICTURES OF KOREA. THE FIRST IS OF A COUNTRY PROCEEDING
MORE OR LESS ON SCHEDULE WITH PROMISES OF POLITICAL EVOLUTION AND HEADED - RATHER UNBELIEVABLY - FOR TRANSFORMATION
FROM THE AUTHORITARIAN ONE-MAN RULE OF THE YUSHIN ENA TU A
FULLY DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM IN NOT MUCH OVER ONE YEAR. THE
SECOND MORE SINISTEM PICTURE FOCUSSES ON CHUN DOO HWAN'S
GRADUAL AGGRANDIZEMENT OF POWER TO THE POINT WHERE MANY
FEEL HE ALREADY CONTROLS BASIC GOVERNMENT PULICY. HE HAS
WON THE BATTLE OVER HIS THIRD STAR, EXTENDED HIS INTELLIGENCE SECURITY NET THROUGHOUT THE ARMED SERVICES BY
MEANS OF A COMMISSAR SYSTEM, AND SET ABOUT DEALING WITH ALL

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PAGE 01 SEOUL 03039 02 OF 05 1223197

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KINDS OF PEOPLE IN A MANNER SUGGESTIVE OF A NATIONAL LEADER RATHER THAN SECURITY OFFICER. GENERALLY, HE GIVES THE IMPRESSION OF A MAN BIDING HIS TIME TO TAKE OVER POWER -- EITHER DIRECTLY ON BEHIND A CIVILIAN FACAUE. BOTH PICTURES PORTRAY IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF SOUTH KOREA'S CONTEMPORARY REALITY. ULTIMATELY THE INMERENT CONTHADIC TIONS WILL HAVE TO BE RESOLVED; YET NO ONE KNOWS EXACTLY HOW AND WHEN THIS WILL OCCUM, AND MOST PEOPLE'S JUDGMENT IS COMPLICATED BY UNCERTAINTY, IGNORANCE, AND RUMOR MONGERING.

8. HOW STABLE IS SOUTH KOREA?

GRANTING THAT THE TUUGHER TESTS LIE AHEAD, THE PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY AND DEMOCHATIC-MINDEDNESS THROUGH 1988 ARE NOT BAD. THE ODDS OF A DANGEROUS DISHUPTION, SUCH AS A MILITARY COUP OR MASSIVE STUDENT/WORKER UPRISING DO NOT SEEM HIGH. AMONG THE MILITARY, THE PROSPECT OF COUNTERACTIONS WITHIN THE ROK ARMY AGAINST THE DECEMBER 12 GROUP HAS RECEDED WITH THE ASSIGNMENT OF NEW (AND FOR THE MOST PART CUMPETENT) OFFICERS INTO KEY TROUP COMMANUS. IN RETROSPECT, MOREOVER, THOSE OFFICERS WHO PROBED OUR REACTION TO POSSIBLE COUNTERACTION APPARENTLY HAD FEW TROUPS AT THEIR READY DISPUSAL. DISGRUNTLED FORCES ARE NOT LIKELY TO CUALESCE DANGEROUSLY UNLESS SERIOUS SUCTAL UNREST

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DEVELOPS. DESPITE HIS FLAT ASSURANCES TO THE CONTRARY, CHUN DOO HHAN MAY THY TO EXTEND HIS STRING-PULLING HOLE FROM THE MILITARY TO THE ENTIRE GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY, BUT HOPEFULLY WILL STOP SHORT OF CAUSING FEAR AND ANTA-GONISMS OF DANGEROUS PROPORTIONS.

9. ON THE CIVIL SIDE, KOREAN SUCIETY WILL PROBABLY BE ABLE TO CONTAIN THE POTENTIAL THREAT FROM STUDENTS WHO ARE SO SELF-CONSCIOUS ABOUT THEIR "HISTORICAL ROLE" AND OFTEN INSENSITIVE TO THE DANGERS OF EXCESS. OTHER POTENTIAL SOUNCES OF UNREST SEEM EITHER OFF BALANCE OR CHASTENED BY FEAR OF MILITARY INTERVENTION. DISSIDENTS ARE GROPING RATHER UNSUCCESSFULLY FOR TARGETS TO ATTACK. POLITICAL OPPOSITION LEADERS -- IN FACT ALL PULITICAL LEADERS -- ARE CUNSTRAINED BY LATENT THREATS AND PREDICTION BY INTERNECINE WARFARE, WHILE WORKERS AND OTHERS WHO CREATED TROUBLE AT THE TIME OF THE PUSAN/MASAN HIOTS SEEM PREPARED TO ACCUMMODATE TO KOREA'S VERY DIFFICULT ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES BY TAKING SOME REDUCTION IN REAL INCOME RATHER THAN TAKING TO THE STREETS.

18. HHO IS REALLY IN CHARGE?

POWER IN KOREA TODAY IS DIFFUSED. THE MILITARY CONTROL
THE RAW POWER WITHOUT THE BUFFER OF A PUWERFUL LEADER TU
KEEP THEM IN THE TRENCHES; AND WITHIN THE MILITARY CHUN
DOO HWAN IS CLEARLY THE MAN TO WATCH. YET THE MILITARY
ARE NOT BRUNNING THE COUNTRY. EVEN THOUGH THEY CAN UBTAIN BLUE HOUSE KATIFICATION FOR DECISIONS IN IME MILITARY
AND SECURITY AREAS, A CIVILIAN COMPLEX OF BUREAUCHATS,
BUSINESSMEN, AND POLITICIANS ARE MAKING AND EXECUTING
MOST OTHER DECISIONS. MOREOVER, THE LONGER THESE CIVILIANS
HEMAIN IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS, THE MORE INFLUENT
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#### INCOMING TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 43

SEUUL 03339 02 OF 85 1223197

TIAL AND AUTHURITATIVE THEY ARE LIKELY TO BE. THE POWER OF THE POLITICIANS IS STILL MARGINAL, BUT IT WILL PROBBABLY INCREASE AS THE COUNTRY HEADS TOWARDS MORE DECISIVE STAGES OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT AND ELECTIONS. THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY IS HUNKEHED DOWN, WORRYING ABOUT "PURIBUSINESS COMMUNITY IS HUNKEHED DOWN, WORRYING ABOUT "PURIBUSINESS COMMUNITY IS HUNKEHED DOWN, WORRYING ABOUT "PURIBUSINESS COMMUNITY IS HUNKEHED DOWN, THE STYLE OF EARLIER ERAS.

11. HOW WELL IS THE SYSTEM FUNCTIONING?

THE GOVERNMENT SYSTEM HAS LOST EFFICIENCY, DISCIPLINE, MOMENTUM, BUT IT IS STILL RUNNING PRETTY WELL -- PARTICU-LARLY IF COMPARED WITH OTHER COUNTRIES OR MEASURED AGAINST PRESIDENT CHOI UNFURTURATELY THE MAGNITUDE OF CHALLENGE: ALLOWS HIMSELF TO BE SEEN AS A FLABBY, HYPERCAUTIOUS LEADER CONTENT WITH FORMAL HOLE PLAYING. EXCEPT FOR FORMA APPEARANCES, HE TENDS TO KEEP THE MILITARY LENGTH, AVOIDING ARGUMENT AND CONFRONTATION. MENT HAS NOT APPEARED DECISIVE, AND RUMORS OF BUSINESS CORRUPTION AND GENERAL LOOSENING UF STANDARDS ARE PREVA-LENT. HOWEVER, THESE IMPRESSIONS OVERLOOK THE FACT THAT THE CHOI GOVERNMENT HAS CONDUCTED THE FIRST STAGE OF POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION WITHOUT LUSING CONTROL AND HAS BEEN FAR MURE DECISIVE THAN MANY ASSUMED -- POLITICALLY, LIFTING EM-S AND ALLOWING KIM THE CHUNG BACK ON THE SCENE; ECONOMICALLY, IN CARRYING THROUGH DEVALUATION AND ENERGY PRICE INCREASES; AND SOCIALLY, IN MAKING CHANGES IN CAMPUS ADMINISTRATION WHICH WERE OPPOSED BY THE GUARDIANS OF LAW

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AND ONDER.

WHAT ARE THE STRATEGIES OF KEY PLAYERS?

ALTHOUGH THE CHUI GOVERNMENT HAS COMMITTED ITSELF TO A PROGRAM OF "ORDERLY DEMOCRATIZATION" HITH PUPULAR ELEC-TIONS WITHIN THE FIRST HALF OF 1981, MANY PEOPLE -- MYSELF INCLUDED -- ARE WURHIED THAT THE PRUCESS WIL. BE JED-PARDIZED OR SERIOUSLY COMPROMISED. TO PUT THE PRUBLEM SIMPLY: PREVAILING OPINION IS THAT THE NOP WOULD SWEEP ANY ELECTION CONDUCTED IN THE NEAR FUTURE BECAUSE OF A NATURAL REACTION TO THE YUSHIN PERIOD; THE MILITARY LEAUER-SHIP VIEW THE PROSPECT OF A NOP-CONTRULLED GOVERNMENT WITH SOMETHING BETWEEN DEEP APPREHENSION AND A DETERMINA-TION TO PREVENT IT; WHILE ALMUST EVERYBUDY AGREES THAT THE KOREAN PEUPLE WOULD BE DEEPLY ANTAGONIZED BY EITHER A MILITARY TAKEUVER IN PRESENT CINCUMSTANCES OR CHASS MANIPULATION OF POPULAR ELECTIONS. NO KOREAN KNOWS HOW THIS DILEMMA IS GOING TO BE MANAGED. THE BEST THEY CAN DU IS TO SURT OUT PUSSIBLE SCENARIUS AND CALCULATE THEIR UNN POTENTIAL RULES -- WHICH ULTIMATELY WILL DE DETERMINED BY THE EMENGING PATTERN UF OTHERS! ACTIONS.

(A) THE MILITARYS

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# Department of State TELEGRAM

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THERE ARE THO GREAT PROBLEMS AMONG MILITARY OFFICERS GENERALLY. FIRST, THE UNDISGUISED DISTRUST OF ALL SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS -- PRE- AND PUST-DECEMBER 12 HIERARCHIES AS WELL AS RETIRED OFFICERS -- TOWARD KIM TAE CHUNG (BECAUSE OF HIS ALLEGED SUFTNESS AND LEFTISM) AND KIN YONG SAM (BECAUSE OF HIS ALLEGED GENERAL INADEQUACY). A DISTURBING NUMBER STATE FLATLY THAT THEY WOULD NOT PERMIT EITHER KIM TO COME TO POWER AND WOULD MOVE TO PREVENT IT IN ADVANCE OF AN ELECTION UR BY COUP AFTER THE ELECTION. FORTUNATELY, OTHERS RECOGNIZE THAT THE ARMY COULD DESTROY ITS CRUCIAL RAPPORT WITH THE CIVILIAN POPU-LATION IF IT WERE TO ARBITRARILY ANNUL THE RESULTS OF A MAJORITY DECISION. SECOND, KOREAN MILITARY OFFICERS VIEW THE PROCESS OF "DEMUCRATIZATION" THROUGH A YUSHIN FILTER, MAKING IT DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO TOLERATE THE DEGREE OF FREE CHOICE AND CRITICISM ASSOCIATED WITH A MUDICUM OF DESPITE THESE POWERFUL PREJUDICES, I CONCLUDE HESITANTLY THAT THE MILITARY HILRARCHY: RECOGNIZES WITH SUFFICIENT HEALISM THAT A PRE-ELECTION COUP WOULD PIT THE ARMY AGAINST THE PEUPLE IN AN UNACCEPTABLE WAY! WILL THUS BE STRUNGLY ATTRACTED TUMARU ANY POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT WHICH MIGHT REDUCE THE PROSPECT OF AN NOP VICTURY; AND, IF THE NOP WEHE NEVERTHELESS TO CUME INTO POWER, MUNE OR LESS UNDERSTANDS THAT THE NOP -- POSSIBLY EVEN KIM TAE CHUNG -- HOULD HAVE TO BE GIVEN TIME TO PROVE ITSELF CAPABLE DR INCAPABLE OF GUIDING THE ROK. IN THE BEST OF CIRCUMSTANCES, THE THREAT OF MILITARY INTERVENTION WILL IN THE BEST OF REMAIN A UAMOCLES SHURD OVER KOREA'S POLITICAL DEVELOP-MENT FOR SOME TIME.

(8) CHUN DOU HWAN!

HE -- AND I SPECIFICALLY INCLUDE MYSELF -- SHOULD RESIST SECKET

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# Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 23

SECUL 03039 43 UF 05 1223247

BY MAKING CHUN DOO HWAN OVERSIMPLIFYING KOREAN POLITICS THE SINISTER SOURCE OF ALL EVIL. HE HAPPENS TO BE ONE OF NUMBER OF KOREANS WHOSE PERSONAL DECISIONS COULD PROVE FATEFUL FOR THEIR COUNTRY. FOR THE SHORT RUN, HE IS STRONGLY CONSTRAINED FROM OPENLY VIOLATING HIS ASSURANCES ABOUT NOT INTERVENING IN POLITICS, AND SU FAR HE HAS HORKED TO CUNTRUL RATHER THAN STIMULATE THE KIND OF UN-REST THAT MIGHT JUSTIFY EXTENSION UF HIS POWER. YET EVEN IF HE CONTINUES TO BIDE HIS TIME, HE WILL WIELD POWER THAT MAKES ALMOST EVERYONE UNCOMFURTABLE. STRUCTURING THE NEXT ELECTION, HE MIGHT PLAY A VERY CHUDE ROLE BUT HE MIGHT CONTENT HIMSELF WITH PLAYING THE ROLE OF A BACKSTAGE MENTOR IF HE COULD FIND A COMBINATION OF POLITICIANS BOTH WILLING TO FRONT FOR HIM AND AGLE TO WIN MARKING TIME WILL NOT BE WITHOUT PROBLEMS AN ELECTION. FOR CHUN BECAUSE HIS OPPONENTS MAY SEEK TO EMBARRASS UR DESTROY HIM, ESPECIALLY IF HE MISPLAYS HIS CARDS. HE IS ALREADY MIDELY FEARLO AND MITHIN THE ARMY EVEN HIS COL-LABORATORS OF DECEMBER 12 MIGHT FEEL BETHAYED IF HE WERE TO REACH OUT FOR OVERT POLITICAL POWER. CLEARLY HE IS GOING TO CONTINUE TO BE ONE OF OUR MAIN PROBLEMS.

(C) THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER:

THE PRIME MINISTER HAS TOLD ME QUITE CANDIDLY THAT HE AND THE PRESIDENT BELIEVE THAT MUCH CONFUSION WILL DEVELOP LATER THIS YEAR WHEN THE NOP AND DRP WILL DISCOVER THAT NONE OF THE KIMS IS A SHOO-IN FOR THE RUKIS NEXT PRESIDENT. THUS THE GOVERNMENT'S STRATEGY IS TO GOVERN AS EFFECTIVELY AS POSSIBLE AND TO ALLOW A POLITICAL STALEMATE TO DEVELOP

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BEFORE SUGGESTING A SOLUTION. ONE SOLUTION APPARENTLY APPEALING TO THE PRIME MINISTER, IF NOT THE PRESIDENT, WOULD BE TO ENTER THE RANKS AS A SUPRA-PARTISAN CANDIDATE IN THE ELECTIONS. THIS WOULD BE EASIER IF THE NOP AND URP WE'S BOTH FRAGMENTED BY THIRD PARTY ACTIVITIES, AND THE GOVERNMENT MAY HOPE THAT KIM THE CHUNG WILL OBLIGE FROM ONE SIDE WHILE SOME BUREAUCRAT/BUSINESS/MILITARY GROUP OBLIGES FROM THE OTHER. I SENSE THE PRIME MINISTER WUULD READILY ENTER THE FRAY IN SUCH CINCUMSTANCES, BUT I CREDIT HIM FOR BEING UNWILLING TO SERVE AS A FRONT FOR A MILITARY CABAL AND RECOGNIZING THAT HE WULLD HAVE TO WIN IN A FAIR ELECTION. MOST OF THE ESTABLISHMENT WOULD BE RE-ASSURED WITH SUCH A PATERNALISTIC ARRANGEMENT IF ONLY THEY COULD FIGURE OUT HUW TO CONVINCE THE VOTERS. IN THE MEANTIME, THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER SEEM RELATIVELY CONFIDENT THAT THEIR SCHEDULE FOR POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION AND ELECTIONS CAN BE MAINTAINED. LIKE THE MILITARY, THEY HAVE IN MIND A MORE CONSERVATIVE CUNCEPT OF DEMOCRACY THAN MUCH OF THE URBAN PUBLIC AND THEY MAY ADOPT & MUKE INTERVENTIONIST HULE THAN MANY PEUPLE THINK FAIR FUR AN INTERIM GUVERNMENT.

(D) THE DRP AND KIM JONG PILE

KIM JONG PIL RECOGNIZES THAT HIS CURRENT PRUSPECTS FOR AN SECKET

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## Department of State

## INCOMING

SECHET

PAGE 82

SEDUL 03039 04 OF 05 1223362

ELECTION VICTORY ARE POOR BUT HE UBVIOUSLY HOPES THAY WITH TIME HE WILL HAVE A CIGHTING CHANCE TO WIN. HE WILL WORK ASSIDUOUSLY TO ENCOURAGE FRACTURES IN THE OPPOSITION AND TRY TO REPAIR THE OHP'S IMAGE THROUGH POLICIES DESIGNED TO APPEAL TO FARMERS AND THE URBAN PUOR. ABOVE ALL HE WILL EXPLOIT HIS ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERIENCE AND HIS RELATIVELY GREATER ACCEPTABILITY TO THE MILITARY THAN EITHER OF THE NOP KIMS. NEVERTHELESS, KIM JONG PIL WILL BE A LONG SHOT UNLESS THE ESTABLISHMENT RALLIES AROUND HIM, WHICH THEY HAVE NOT SO FAR. HE HAS THE LIABILITIES OF PAST CORRUPTION, CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH YUSHIN, AND POWERFUL ENEMIES WITHIN THE DRP. MANY MILITARY OFFICERS SEE HIM SIMPLY AS PREFERABLE TO THE NOP KIMS AND NOTHING MORE.

E. NDP KIM YUNG SAM AND KIM TAE CHUNG:

THE NOP'S RATHER UNGUESTIONED ADVANTAGE IS THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY WIN DECISIVELY IF A POPULARITY CONTEST WERE CONDUCTED IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, AND ITS GREAT LIABILITY IS THE UNDISGUISED DISTRUST OF THE MILITARY LEADERS (THOUGH NOT NECESSARILY THE THOOPS). ALTHOUGH NEITHER KIM YONG SAM NOW KIM TAE CHUNG HAS LET WURRY OVERHIDE HIS AMBITION, NUP LEADERS KNOW VERY WELL THAT A PARTY SPLIT WOULD KEEP POWER OUT OF THEIR GRASP. TO A LESSER EXTENT THERE ARE GLIMMERINGS OF AWARENESS THAT OVER TIME THE NOP MAY BE FORCED TO DEMONSTRATE MORE CONVINCINGLY THAN IN THE PAST THAT IT IS CAPABLE UP INTELLIGENT POLICIES AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION, NOT JUST OPPOSITION FIREHORKS.

THE STRATEGIES OF THE THO KIMS REFLECT THESE CONSIDERATIONS. THEY ARE PLAYING MATHER ROUGHLY WITH EACH OTHER SECRET



## Department of State

### INCOMING TELEGRAM

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BUT ARE AT LEAST TRYING NOT TO SPLIT THE PARTY WHILE THEY BOTH BLAME ALL ILLS ON THE CHOI GOVERNMENT AND ARGUE THAT KIM JONG PIL CAN NEVER ESCAPE HIS YUSHIN ASSOCIA-TION. NEITHER KIM HAS YET DAKED TO PURSUE THE CORRUPTION ISSUE WHICH REACHES WITHIN THEIR UWN HANKS, AND, AND STRIKING BREAK FROM THE PAST, BUTH HAVE COMMENDABLY RE-FRAINED FROM INFLAMING PUBLIC PASSIONS OR SNIPING AT SENSITIVE ISSUES SUCH AS POLICY TUWARD THE NORTH/SOUTH THE IMAGEMAKERS OF BOTH KIMS ARE NUNKING KOREAN DIALUGUE. ON THE PROBLEM OF "POLICY-MINDEDNESS" AND KIM YONG SAM HAS AT LEAST TRIED TO IMPROVE HIS MILITARY TIES. THIS EFFORTS SO FAR HAVE NOT MADE MUCH OF A DENT. KIMETAE CHUNG HAS TAKEN THE PROUD STAND THAT HE IS HEADY TO CONSULT WITH THE MILITARY IF THEY TAKE THE INITIATIVE, PRESUMABLY AN INDICATION THAT HE EITHER FAILS TURUNDER-STAND HIS PROBLEM OR IS TOYING WITH A DANGEHOUS KIND OF THE NOP WILL PROBABLY AVOID A "OVERHEATED" APPROACH FOR A FEW MORE MONTHS TO BUILD UP THE IMAGE OF SOBRIETY, TO AVOID BEING CHARGED WITH ENDANGERING THE PROSPECTS FUR CONTINUING CIVILIAN RULE, AND TO SORT OUT THE LEADERSHIP CONTEST WITHIN THE PARTY. AT SOME PUINT, HOWEVER, IT WILL ALMOST SURELY TAKE OFF THE GLOVES EVEN AT THE RISK OF A CRACKDOWN BY THE AUTHORITIES.

13. UNLESS THE STUDENTS OR OTHERS GET OUT OF HAND, KOREA IS LIKELY TO REMAIN FAIRLY STABLE FOR THE NEXT FEW MONTHS BECAUSE: THE SOLDIERS KNOW THE PEOPLE WOULD NOT ACCEPT A MILITARY TAKEOVER; GENERAL CHUN HAS PAINTED HIMSELF INTO A CORNER IN TERMS OF EXTENDING HIS FORMAL POHER; THE POLITICIANS KNOW THAT THEIR GRADUALLY EXPANDED

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003338 01 07 INCOMING 13 HAR 57 Department of State. TELEGRAM 1247442 NODIS REVIEW SECUL 03839 - Certion removed transferred to O FADEC AUS-00 OCT-01 1207467 /10 de OFARE 0 1206237 MAR 86 FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL TO SECSTATE WASHOU IMMEDIATE NODIS ING CONTEST IS AT THE SUFFERANCE OF MARTIAL LAW AUTHORI-TIES! THE CHOI GOVERNMENT KNOWS IT HAS THE CENTRAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREVENTING CHAOTIC DEVELOPMENT; AND THE GENERAL POPULACE SELMS MORE ON LESS SATISFIED OR AT LEAST UNWILLING TO MANIFEST ITS UNHAPPENESS BY DRAMATIC ACTION. THE DISPOSITION OF THE KIM JAE KYU CASE AND THE LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW WILL BE TRICKY, BUT THE CHUNCH POINTS WILL THE FINAL STAGE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENUMENT AND STRUCTURAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE NEXT ELECTIONS. CHANCE OF VERY SERIOUS CONTROVERSY OVER THESE ISSUES IS GREAT, MAGNIFIED BY A STAGGERING DEGREE OF REGIONAL HOPEFULLY GENERAL CHUN AND LIKE-MINDED MILITARY ANIMOSITY. OFFICERS WILL RESTRAIN THEMSELVES WHILE PULITICIANS WORK OUT COMPROMISES THAT WILL ALLOW AT LEAST SOME PROGRESS IN THE CURRENT NUK EXPERIMENT IN PULITICAL LIBERALIZATION. WHATEVER THE OUTCOME, WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL THAT SOUTH KOREA HAS MAINTAINED ITS BASIC COMESION AND WILL PRUBABLY CONTINUE TO DO 50. GENERAL AICKHAM CONCURS IN THIS ASSESSMEN TIONS ON POLICY FULLUM SEPTEL. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TORYON SECHET NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT