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KOREA: The Forgotten Struggle



Korea Support Committee

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OUR HISTORY AND PURPOSE

The Korea Support Committee was formed in December 1981. We are a group of teachers, trade unionists, Christians, students, political activists, and journalists in the Bay Area. We have joined together to support the Korean movement for democracy and reunification, and to focus attention on the violations of human rights by the Chun Doo Hwan regime—a government supported politically, economically, and militarily by the United States.

We believe the situation in south Korea is rooted in the tragic division of the peninsula, and that this division is perpetuated by the support given the regime in the south by American and Japanese corporations, the U.S. military, and the Japanese and American governments. We believe that U.S. intervention has also been harmful to the American people. Many American workers have lost their jobs because U.S. companies have taken advantage of low wages and the repression of workers to move to south Korea. While we witness our own basic needs—education, health care, housing, and jobs—deteriorate, millions of our tax dollars go to U.S. bases in Korea, and weapons and training for the Korean military. If another war breaks out in Korea, thousands of Americans and Koreans could die—and the world could be threatened by a nuclear holocaust.

We support the right of the Korean people to establish a democratic government and to reunify their country peacefully, without foreign interference of any kind.

Recognizing that the main impediment to these goals is the U.S., we are calling for:

- The withdrawal of all U.S. forces and nuclear weapons from Korea
- Ending all economic and military aid to the Chun Doo Hwan regime
- Peace talks between the U.S. and north Korea.

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Korea: The Forgotten Holocaust

Geography of Korea

The North Korean invasion of

South Korea in 1950

and the Korean War

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*We dedicate this booklet,
with the utmost respect and gratitude,
to the over two thousand courageous Korean women and men
who gave their lives in the city of Kwangju
in May 1980 to teach the world
the true meaning of liberation.*

The 1980

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KOREA SUPPORT COMMITTEE

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Asian names are written with the family name first, as is the Asian custom. An exception is made for people such as Syngman Rhee whose names are well known in the Western order.

We have chosen to leave the first letter in north and south Korea in the lower case because this indicates two regions of an artificially divided nation, rather than two permanently separate countries. The official names of north Korea and south Korea are, respectively, the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK).

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Korea: The Forgotten Struggle

Geography of Korea

The Korean Peninsula juts out of the Asian mainland into the Japan Sea. It is bordered by China to the West, the Soviet Union to the North and Japan to the East. This geographic position has made it a crossroads of people, trade, culture and foreign armies for many centuries.

Korea is a very mountainous country, with most of the lowland areas in the south. Consequently, 39 million people live in the south, while the more mountainous north supports a population of 18 million.

Korea is roughly the equivalent in size to the state of Minnesota, about 85,000 square miles. North Korea is larger, the size of Pennsylvania, and south Korea, much more densely populated, is the size of Indiana. The winters are severe and the summers are very humid throughout the peninsula.

Both the north and south have ample natural resources. The north has been able to harness hydroelectric power for development, but the south, lacking the water power of the north, must rely on imported, non-renewable energy sources for its development.

Korea's strategic geopolitical position in Northeast Asia and its strong economic development, both in the north and south, assure that the peninsula will continue to play a significant part in world politics for centuries to come.

The U.S. In Korea: Rapidly Changing Attitudes

On April 17, 1982, 42 south Korean Christian leaders released a statement calling for the United States to leave Korea:

The Korean people have considered the United States to be our most gracious neighbor since national liberation in 1945...But a decisive change took place when the U.S. government tolerated the Kwangju incident of May, 1980, which

became an incurable wound in the hearts of the Korean people.

U.S. policy toward Korea and the attitude of its officials seems to say that democracy can be enjoyed only by superior people like Americans whose annual per capita income reaches \$10,000 and not by others like Korean people whose per capita income is only 1/10 of that.

Just two weeks later Vice President George Bush arrived in Seoul, Korea for official ceremonies marking "100 years of U.S.-Korean friendship." The church leaders con-

cluded their declaration by calling on the U.S. to recall Ambassador Richard Walker, and General John Wickham, commander of U.S. forces in the Combined Forces Command, which includes 80% of south Korea's 600,000 active-duty troops and 40,000 U.S. troops.

The Christian leaders were reacting to the Korean government's total disregard for human rights, and its apparent ignorance of rapidly growing anti-U.S. sentiment after students in the southern port



of Pusan set fire to the U.S. Information Service (USIS) Center there on March 18, 1982.

Leaflets left inside the USIS building and scattered throughout the area demanded the withdrawal of the 40,000 U.S. troops in south Korea and warned of more attacks. The statement implored that the U.S. "stop making this country a subject state and withdraw from this land," and claimed "the U.S. has supported the military regime which refused democratization, social revolution and development and unification...In fact, the U.S. has brought about the permanent national division." The statement also denounced U.S. and Japanese economic subjugation of Korea, and criticized the Korean government for planning to host the 1988 Summer Olympics. Security forces have already been increased by several thousand using the excuse of preparing for the Olympics.

The south Korean government rounded up 16,000 people in the days after the fire. This attack on the U.S., Chun's major source of support, brought an extreme reaction. On the basis of confessions extracted under torture, two men were sentenced to death. The Reagan Administration, sensing an explosion of anti-Americanism if the two were killed, put pressure on Chun to reduce the sentences. So on March 15, 1983, Chun reduced their sentences to life imprisonment—life in prison for speaking the truth about the role of the U.S. in Korea.

The attack on the USIS building represented a radical change in the direction of the south Korea movement for democracy and reunification. Until May 1980, most Koreans saw the U.S. as a friend. The Korean Civil War (1950-53) had been a long, brutal war, with atrocities on both sides; and for 30 years the Korean people have been told of the "evils of communism," and that the U.S. intervened in that war to protect south Korea.

As late as June 30, 1979, when then President Carter visited Seoul, the overall U.S. role in Korea was not questioned. Two small, but dramatic demonstrations against

Carter's visit protested continued U.S. support for the "Shah of Korea," the late President Park. Protesters criticized Carter's two-faced stand on human rights, but they did not publically question the presence of 40,000 U.S. troops, nor U.S. and Japanese economic interests which dominate key sectors of the economy.

Criticism of U.S. intervention has increased in student leaflets and church statements in 1983 and 1984. Two more American cultural centers, in Kwangju and Taegu, have since been fire-bombed. While TV cameras showed thousands of south Koreans lining the streets (orchestrated by the south Korean government) to welcome President Reagan when he visited Seoul in November 1983, hundreds of students were arrested for anti-U.S. demonstrations, and hundreds more put on house arrest. A reported 100,000 security police were mobilized to protect Reagan. It is imperative that as Americans we support the democratic movement in south Korea and understand the repressive role the U.S. plays there. This pamphlet attempts to help us do just that: to give the reader an awareness of the historic political, economic and military role the U.S. has played in south Korea.

Historical Background

In the first few decades of the 19th Century, the imperialist powers—France, Britain, Germany and Russia—were advancing into Asia, attempting to carve out blocks of territory for use as markets, investment sites and sources of raw materials. After the Civil War, the United States also began to expand into the Asia-Pacific area.

As the Western powers encroached on the Asian mainland and Japan, Korea—then a unified but isolated kingdom with a rich cultural heritage and an agrarian economy—also began to feel the impact of the imperialist advance.

In 1868, the United States, having forced open trade with Japan, sent a warship—the General Sherman—to Korea in an attempt to open its

doors to countries other than China. At this time Korea was a tributary of China and carried on most of its trade with and paid tribute to the Chinese government. Fearful of western domination, Koreans attacked and burned the General Sherman and repulsed a squadron of U.S. soldiers sent in retaliation two years later.

The 1870's saw the entry of Japan into Korea and the eruption of conflict between China and Japan over control of the peninsula. In 1876, Japanese gunships forced the Korean court to sign a treaty ending Korea's tributary relationship with China and opening up several ports to Japanese goods.

In 1882, the Korean military rebelled and overthrew the faction of the Korean court that had allowed this Japanese penetration. An "anti-foreign faction" re-established the tributary relationship with China.

To prevent further Japanese penetration into Korea, China ordered the Korean court to sign commercial agreements with foreign nations. In 1882, Korea signed the first of these agreements—under duress from the Chinese—with the United States.

Yet, despite this attempt to keep Japan out, the weak Chinese government could not prevent Japanese merchants from continuing to sell goods and buy Korean food and land.

But Japan's control over Korea drew Russian response, and soon these two countries were fighting over Korea. The Japanese victory in 1905—the first defeat of a western nation by an Asian country in modern times—led to the outright annexation of Korea by Japan, and an agreement with the U.S. over control of Asia and the Pacific. On July 28, 1905, U.S. Secretary of War, William Taft, signed an agreement with Japanese Prime Minister Katsura that in exchange for a free U.S. hand in Philippines, Japan should establish military control over Korea, which it held for the next 40 years. Formal annexation began in 1910.



The Japanese were guilty of many atrocities against the Koreans

Under Japanese Colonial Rule

The Japanese colonial rulers moved quickly to exploit Korea's rice growing southern regions. Land surveys were conducted and tens of thousands of Korean peasants lost their land. Many became tenant farmers, and many went to Japan in search of work.

On March 1, 1919, anti-Japanese independence demonstrations took place outside the country. Known as the March First, or Samil Movement, the demonstrations met with violent reaction from the Japanese: over 7400 people were killed and 6000 wounded, and over 750 homes, churches and schools were burned.

From 1919 on, leadership of the anti-Japanese independence movement was active mostly outside of the Korean peninsula, while repression within Korea increased. As Japan began its war against China in the late 1930's, Korean rice was taken to feed Japan's armies, and tens of thousands of Korean peasants were forced to go to Japan to work in coal mines and factories, or abducted into the Imperial Army. Heavy industry was developed in the north to support Japan's war efforts. Koreans were prohibited from speaking in Korean, and were forced

to take Japanese names and to worship Japan's state religion. This period of harsh colonial rule has left deep-rooted anti-Japanese sentiments among the Korean people.

U.S. Occupation

The U.S. returned to Korea again in 1945 as victor over Japan. Unwilling to grant Korea status as an independent nation, within a week after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the U.S. War Department proposed dividing Korea at the 38th parallel. Although Soviet troops had already reached that far south, and American troops did not land in Korea until September, the Soviet Union agreed. Thus, the two great powers agreed to divide Korea "temporarily" until it became "fit" for self-rule. The U.S. accepted surrender of Japan in the south; the Soviet Union accepted surrender in the north.

From the beginning of the Soviet and U.S. occupation, there were serious differences between the two powers about how Korea was to be administered and reunited. Quickly on the heels of Japan's defeat, the Korean people had established a network of political committees to prepare for self-rule. Known as

Peoples Committees, they began to take administrative responsibility throughout the peninsula. The Soviet Union recognized the Peoples Committees in the north; the United States refused to accept their legitimacy in the south. Instead, Commanding General John Hodge declared military rule in the south and left the Japanese colonial police in power to enforce it. This act quickly turned public opinion against the Americans.

In the north, the first stages of a socialist revolution took place, with extensive land reform, nationalization of all Japanese-owned industries, and the declaration of an eight-hour day. While these reforms were undoubtedly in line with Soviet policy, they also reflected the will of Korea's highly organized working class.

In the south, leftist worker and peasant unions were widespread. According to most accounts, the Korean Workers Party (the Communist Party), had a stronger base in the south than in the north. When U.S. forces entered south Korea, the workers had already taken over most public and private enterprises, and a Korean Peoples Republic, which articulated the demands of the peasants and the radicalized work force, had been proclaimed.

The urgent demands for land reform by the peasant unions, and the occupation of factories by workers were seen by U.S. military commanders in Korea as dangerous signs of communist influence—contrary to U.S. goals in Asia—and not as legitimate demands of a sovereign nation.

Ruling through the collaborators, the Japanese police and wealthy landlords, the U.S. refused to recognize the Peoples Republic and began a campaign of terror and intimidation against the left. By boosting conservative forces into power in the south, the U.S. transformed what would have been a peaceful revolution into a bloody civil war that eventually cost millions of Korean, American and Chinese lives.

After the U.S. banned the Peoples

Republic in the south, it created a pro-American, anti-communist regime. A conservative Korean independence leader, Syngman Rhee, was brought from the United States and installed as President. Pro-labor organizations were banned and replaced by pro-government unions. Many labor activists were arrested; some were executed. Literally hundreds of thousands of peasants were arrested and tried for disobeying U.S. Occupation Laws. High schools were turned into prisons; under the U.S., there were more 'criminals' than under Japanese colonialism.

This is how Mark Gayn, an American reporter, described the unrest in south Korea in 1946:

It was a full-scale revolution, which must have involved hundreds of thousands, if not millions of people. In Taegu alone a third of the 150,000 inhabitants took part in the uprising. It was here that the fuse of the revolution was set off last month. The railroad workers went on strike, followed by the phone and metal, textile and electronic workers. As each strike was suppressed by the police, another one took its place. Students went out into the streets to demonstrate, and then the whole city was aflame.'

By 1947, the Rhee government had succeeded in putting down the peasant and labor movements, but at the cost of thousands of lives. Although many Koreans were in favor of forming a single Korean government, the process of inner unification came to an end when separate republics were established in south and north Korea in 1948.

The Cold War

Events in Korea were taking place in the broader context of the Cold War in Asia. Not long after Japan's surrender, U.S. policy changed from stabilizing the area from the destructive impact of war to building up Japan as the center of capitalism in Asia. It was quickly recognized by the U.S. that this was possible only if Japan could still have access to the raw materials and labor of its former empire.

Japan's most important colonies, Manchuria and the northern half of Korea, were lost. U.S. policy began to concentrate on southeast Asia, especially Indochina and Indonesia. What it did in Korea it repeated in

the Philippines and Vietnam. The thrust of U.S. policy was to work through pro-American forces within each country to "modernize" their political and economic system and keep them within the U.S. orbit; and to build an anti-communist alliance encircling the Soviet Union and China.

By 1947, Japan had become the linchpin of this strategy. After a short period of liberalization in which Japanese war criminals and some of their industrial supporters were purged from public life, the U.S. reversed course. Instead of political reform, the rebuilding of Japanese industry came to be a primary objective.

The Korean Civil War: Climax of the Cold War

The American campaign against the left in both Japan and south Korea was integrally linked to U.S. global policies. By June 1950—the date the full-scale war in Korea began—the Truman Administration was pushing a plan to rearm America, and build an anti-Soviet military alliance in Europe. The U.S. also desired a military compact with Japan.

Why was the U.S. leadership so hysterical about "communism"? By the end of 1949 the Soviet Union had acquired nuclear technology. The Communist Party had seized state power in China, culminating a fifty-year old revolution. Anti-colonial movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America threatened the wealth of U.S. allies in Europe and of American corporations. Within the U.S., reaction had set in against the progressive steps of the New Deal and the rising strength of organized labor.

In this atmosphere of paranoia, Truman ordered a study of U.S. options in the face of the "loss" of China and the Soviet acquisition of nuclear technology. The result was National Security Council Paper 68 (NSC 68), "one of the key documents of the Cold War."²

NSC 68 advocated a large U.S. military buildup "with the intention of righting the power balance and in the hope that through means

other than all-out war we could induce a change of the Soviet System."³ As Steven Ambrose writes, this "became the basis for American foreign policy over the next twenty years" and "provided the justification for America's assuming the role of world policemen."⁴

But NSC 68 meant a huge military budget increase in peacetime, a very unpopular idea. Taking on the role of the world's police force also signalled a profound change in U.S. global policy towards the Soviet Union and meant a reversal in policy towards former enemies, Japan and Germany. Thus when NSC 68 was brought to Truman in early June 1950, he lacked both Congressional and popular support to implement it. As Steven Ambrose has written:

By June 1950, a series of desperate needs had come together. Truman has to have a crisis to sell the N.S.C. 68 program; Chiang could not hold on in Formosa nor Rhee in South Korea without an American commitment; the U.S. Air Force and Navy needed a justification to retain their bases in Japan; the Democrats had to prove to the McCarthyites that they could stand up to the communists in Asia as well as in Europe.'

The skillful manipulation of what was perceived as a "sudden attack" on south Korea by "communist armies armed by Stalin" was used to turn U.S. policies around. The U.S. Congress quickly approved NSC 68 and authorized U.S. intervention in Korea, elsewhere in Asia, and around the world in support of "democracy".

As a returned U.S. Navy officer has summarized, the intervention in Korea set the pattern for nearly 35 years of U.S. Asian policy.⁵

Civil War in Korea

The U.S. justified its intervention in Korea by claiming that north Korean forces invaded the south by surprise the morning of June 25, 1950. It is considered nearly treasonous to question this explanation.

But to ignore the events of 1945 to 1950 in explaining the war is to tell a lie. The Korean War was largely the result of U.S. actions directed against the demands for independence and

democracy by the Korean people.

In 1949 Syngman Rhee still faced serious opposition and strong demands for unification of the country. Meetings and consultations between southerners and northerners about unification occurred regularly until the end of 1949, when Rhee had several legislators imprisoned and Kim Ku, the "grand old man of the independence movement," was assassinated. On May 30, 1950, elections took place in the south, and Rhee's party lost heavily to independents, among whom were men with northern connections who believed in and publically espoused unification.

A few weeks after this election, north Korea made another proposal calling for the establishment of a united Korean government. This announcement said the north would talk to anyone but Rhee and seven other collaborators all of whom it said should be imprisoned as national traitors. Amidst these tensions, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles visited Korea, calling it "in the front line of freedom." Days later full-scale fighting broke out between the armies of the south and the north.

The massive U.S. intervention that followed in September established the military alliance between the

U.S. and Japan, and brought Japan out of its postwar economic slump. During the war, the Japanese steel and munitions industry reached full capacity, selling nearly all its exports to the U.S. military effort. U.S. technology began pouring into Japan, creating strong corporate and state links between the U.S. and Japan. In 1952, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was signed, making Japan the partner of the U.S. in its war against social revolution in Asia, and guaranteeing the presence of U.S. bases in Japan.

After landing in Inchon on September 15th, U.S. forces moved up to the 38th parallel, the "temporary" border since 1945. Then Truman and his cabinet decided to invade the north. The unification of Korea by the U.S., Truman thought, "would inflict a momentous defeat on the strategy of Soviet expansionism."

Truman's extension of the war—especially the bombing of the hydroelectric dam along the Yalu River—brought the Chinese into the war. As the Chinese and north Korean armies forced the U.S. southward, the U.S. Air Force proceeded to destroy the north with saturation bombing. Twice during the course of the war the U.S. threatened to drop nuclear weapons.

When the armistice was signed on July 28, 1953, most of the peninsula was in ruins. According to U.S. Air Force testimony, "just before the Chinese came in we were grounded. There were no more targets in Korea." In other words, everything on the ground had been destroyed. Some 3 million Koreans died in the war—one-tenth of the total population in 1950. The U.S. suffered 142,091 casualties, including 33,629 killed.

Rhee—who had been at odds with the U.S. throughout the war over his domestic policies and the peace negotiations—got an "iron-clad commitment" from the U.S. to defend south Korea in the future. The formation of a unified but independent Korea was once again blocked by the U.S.

Postwar South Korea

The 1950's: Period of Syngman Rhee

The Korean War left the nation bitterly divided. People in the north remembered the terrible bombing raids and the brutal occupation by the U.S.; people in the south remembered violence inflicted upon them by north Korean soldiers and the Chinese. Both sides were left with extensive war damage and millions of homeless people.

But with Syngman Rhee still in power in the south, nothing much changed. In the seven years between the armistice and Rhee's overthrow, the conservative landlords and bureaucratic capitalists maintained their power, doing little for economic growth, clinging to US aid handouts for their survival. As public dissatisfaction with Rhee increased, so did Rhee's repressive tactics. Torture, jailings of political opponents, censorship, and bannings of labor leaders were commonplace. Rhee's primary claim to legitimacy was his constant call to attack the north and unite Korea under his rule.



Despite mutual antipathy, President Truman and General MacArthur manage broad smiles for one another at the Wake Island conference, October 1951.

The economy under Rhee was managed largely by the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID). During the 1950s and early 1960s, U.S. aid accounted for five-sixths of the country's imports, and was primarily in the form of surplus grain. The massive amounts of surplus commodities from the U.S. undermined the price of grain grown by Korean farmers, causing widespread poverty in the countryside.

Changes in Korea came mainly from U.S. pressure, which by the end of the 1950s wanted south Korea integrated with the Japanese economy and the Japan-U.S. Security System.

By this time, the initial development of Japan's economic base had been completed, and Japanese capitalists were eager to invest overseas, especially in places like south Korea where labor was cheaper than in Japan. The U.S. was also looking towards Japan as a partner in developing other non-communist nations in Asia, countries that were seen as valuable sources of labor, raw materials and markets—and as allies in the struggle against social revolution and the Soviet Union and China. Rhee's hostility to Japan and his strong opposition to Japanese economic penetration no longer fit U.S. policies in Asia.

In April, 1960, a wave of student-led demonstrations threatened Syngman Rhee's government. Rhee was forced to resign—partly through pressures from the U.S. During the demonstrations that rocked Seoul, the U.S. military command refused to allow Korean troops to be armed with live ammunition. The U.S. also pressured Rhee through embassy channels and on the Armed Forces Radio.

Rhee was replaced by Chang Myon, who was anxious to be more cooperative with the U.S. In early 1961 the government devalued the Won and implemented some of the economic reforms desired by the U.S.



Korean students riot in the streets of Seoul against the administration of Park Chung Hee, which had ratified a friendship treaty with Japan.

But the political forces that had brought Chang to power wanted more than economic reform. Throughout the Rhee period, harsh repression had prevented open discussion of south Korea's future, its role in the world, and its relations with the U.S., Japan, or north Korea. Anxious for major changes in south Korea's economic and political direction, many Koreans saw the 1960 revolution as the first step in unifying the country and creating a national economy less dependent on the U.S. Chang Myon's policies, which were "politically difficult at any time" were "totally unacceptable to (his) constituency."

In the months after the overthrow of Rhee there was an unprecedented level of political activity. Demonstrations for unification or against Japan were an everyday occurrence. At one point, students forced their way into the National Assembly and demanded successfully that key officials of the Rhee government be imprisoned. Newspapers were filled with discussions about democracy, unification, and other issues that had been taboo since 1950.

Of particular significance were the contacts made with the north at this time. As the year progressed, plans

were made for a series of meetings at the DMZ between student groups from both sides.

On May 16, 1961, three days before this meeting was to take place, approximately 3,000 soldiers led by Park Chung Hee and Kim Chong Pil overthrew the Chang government and immediately put an end to the constitutional reforms and decentralization policies of the government, as well as what the military considered the "chaos" caused by student and worker unrest. Martial law was declared, prominent opposition figures arrested. All discussion of reunification was banned. Censorship was imposed on the media. With the beginning of military rule came the transition to south Korea's export industrialization.

The period from April, 1960 to May, 1961 was an exciting one for many Koreans, who, for the first time in their memory, had an opportunity to say what they thought about the future of Korea. A Korean resident of Oakland who emigrated from south Korea in the mid-60s, describes those days:

I was a senior in college and on the front lines during the overthrow of Rhee. I was lucky to survive. After April 19, (1961) I remember day and night on the

media, in meetings, all we were talking about was reunification. One of the most popular proposals was "Austrian-style" neutrality, which was advocated by Mansfield at the time. (Mansfield is presently U.S. Ambassador to Japan.)

Everyone remembers the student slogans, "Go north; have the north come south; meet at Panmunjom." Messages between southern and northern student groups had been exchanged, and a date had been set for a meeting. But one week before the meeting, Park Chung Hee took over—just like Chun Doo Hwan moved in 1980 to stop the government from lifting martial law.

Everybody was excited about the prospects for reunification—everyone except the army and a few corrupt people. All the newspapers were filled with articles about the upcoming meetings; there wasn't much public criticism of the movement.

Park Chung Hee blocked the course of history.

The 1960's:

The Period of Park Chung Hee

Under Park Chung Hee, south Korea changed from a primarily agricultural country to one with a large manufacturing base. The military government of Park organized a massive program of "modernization," based on producing goods for export, borrowing money from foreign banks, and encouraging investment by multinational corporations.

The most important event of Park's rule was the 1965 Normalization Treaty with Japan, which brought over \$800 million in loans and investments from Japan, making possible south Korea's first "spurt" of industrialization. Signed after several years of negotiations and months of demonstration in both Japan and Korea, the treaty was forced on the Korean people through the declaration of martial law and the placing of tanks and troops around the National Assembly.

After 1965, Japanese capital began to pour into south Korea, starting with import substitution industries, and then moving into bonded processing zones for export. Within five years, Japan was the dominant economic power and controlled the textile, garment and elec-

tronic industries.

After signing the Treaty, Japan granted south Korea \$500 million in loans and \$300 million in direct investments. This grant was the "shot in the arm" needed by the export-first program, which had been set in motion in 1964 by the U.S. AID and the Korean government.

Essentially, the export program meant that south Korea's survival depended on its performance in the world market. Creating surplus capital for investment from domestic sources such as agriculture was rejected in favor of borrowing money from abroad and paying for these loans through the export of manufactured goods. The goods were to be manufactured by low-wage labor from the countryside, where permanent stagnation had set in because of the import of U.S. surplus grains.

The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank coordinated their lending plans with multinational corporations to create an infrastructure for investment and a platform for the export of manufactured goods. Between 1962 and 1978, exports grew at an average of 30% a year, reaching \$12.7 billion in 1978.

From 1962 to 1968, foreign investments were predominantly American, and largely directed towards supplying Korea's domestic market with oil, fertilizers and so on. Since 1968, most investments have been Japanese, and have been concentrated in manufacturing—particularly textiles and electronics.

The 1970's:

The Period of Heavy Industrialization

In 1969, President Nixon and Japanese Premier Sato met to discuss the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In their joint communique, Nixon and Sato agreed that south Korea was essential to the security of Japan. This statement recognized the importance of Japan's investments in south Korea, and signalled U.S. determination to defend this sphere.

Politically, the Nixon-Sato communique meant that Japan was now

a full partner in the U.S. strategy of dominance in Asia. For south Korea, it meant a massive industrialization program in the heavy and chemical industries, and in military production. The massive investments for these projects came primarily from Japan. After the communique was signed, Japanese businessmen drew up a plan for the integration of certain industries between Japan and south Korea. This plan allowed Japanese industrialists to shift polluting industries such as petrochemicals and labor-intensive industries like shoes and electronics to south Korea. As these industries were built up in Korea, Japanese industry could move into more sophisticated industries like machinery.

In south Korea, the government and the large industries chose this route for two reasons. One, they saw the necessity of building a military industry because the U.S. was beginning to pull its ground forces out of Asia in the wake of its defeat in Vietnam. Second, they saw that only through building heavy industry could they approach the "advanced nation" status of Japan and the U.S. and bring economic "prosperity" to the south Korean people.

But this heavy industrialization necessitated even sterner measures than the early program of export-led growth. To guarantee industrial "harmony" and the consolidation of the nation's labor and financial power, a new constitution was passed in 1972. Called "Yushin" or revitalizing constitution, the new order placed further restriction on labor organizing and strikes, outlawed most forms of protest, and gave the president unprecedented powers to issue emergency decrees. From this date on the movement for democracy expanded.



Spring Of Democracy and the 1980 Kwangju Uprising

In the first three months of 1980 there were more than 100 strikes, ten times more than in the previous ten years. From early April workers in hundreds of work places held sit-ins and strikes. Many won major concessions, including the recognition of independent, democratic unions. In one of the most militant worker actions since 1949, coal miners took over the town of Sabuk, west of Seoul, for four days. The military surrounded the town and the miners surrendered after being promised a thorough investigation into their demands for improved working conditions and pay.

From the start of the school year in March, students demanded academic freedom. Through strikes and demonstrations they won the expulsion of many professors and university presidents who had openly supported Park, or who had run the schools primarily for profit. With the support of older students, freshmen began refusing mandatory military training on campus en masse. Biting political comment flowered in the form of traditional mask-dance performances.

In the second week of May, hundreds of thousands of students demonstrated in the streets of Seoul, demanding an end to martial law and the restoration of democracy.

Due to widespread hatred of Park's rule, even the government recognized the need for change. When the interim government promised to consider the student's demands, the students called off their mass protests, and set May 17 as the deadline for the government to publically announce its schedule for a return to democratic rule. Both the opposition and ruling parties declared their intention to vote for an end to martial law.

But before martial law could be lifted, General Chun Doo Hwan led a second coup d'etat to take full control of the government. In December 1979, he led a coup

within the Korean military by illegally moving troops under the command of U.S. General John Wickham from the border with north Korea to arrest the martial law commander appointed by the government. Wickham publically criticized Chun for this move, but did nothing to stop his march to dictatorial rule. When approached by a group of Korean generals for support for a counter-coup against Chun in January, Gen. Wickham refused. Korean observers believe that Wickham, under whom Chun served in Vietnam, had secretly been promoting his subordinate for some time.



Chun Doo Hwan, self-appointed strongman, swears himself into office, Sept. 1, 1980, in Seoul.

As head of Korean military intelligence, the U.S. decided that Chun would be willing and able to take control of an increasingly restless population. In April, Chun accepted "appointment" as head of the dreaded Korean CIA, also illegal due to provisions that forbid a uniformed military officer from holding that post.

Now in control of the two most powerful organizations in south Korea, the military and civilian intelligence agencies, Chun was ready to direct the coup that brought down the curtain on south Korea's "democratic spring" on May

17, 1980.

Chun extended martial law to cover the entire nation, and closed the National Assembly. The 40,000 U.S. troops in Korea were ordered to full alert; thousands of south Korean troops and tanks were deployed in the major cities. Paratroopers occupied all universities. Hundreds of trade unionists, students and opposition figures who had spoken out since the October 1979 assassination of Dictator Park were arrested. Once again, south Korea was under the iron heel of military rule.

But in Kwangju, a rural city of 700,000 in the southeast, demonstrations continued.⁸ The day after the coup, 5000 students clashed with martial law troops and paratroopers. Under cover of pepper fog, paratroopers—many with experience in Vietnam—began an indiscriminate slaughter. Junior high school girls were stripped in a public square and had their breasts cut off before being killed. A pregnant woman had her fetus ripped out by a bayonet. Paratroopers searched and destroyed homes and other buildings in search of anyone resembling students. A group of taxi drivers were brutally slaughtered when they were caught helping demonstrators escape. Dead bodies were loaded onto military trucks and taken away to mass graves.

The citizens of Kwangju refused to be intimidated by this bloody spectacle. On May 19th, 20,000 people demonstrated in the streets. The next day the crowds had swollen to over 100,000. On the 20th, after several hundred people were gunned down by machine-gun fire, weapons were seized from police stations and armories. A "citizens army" of factory workers, unemployed people, and students was formed, and open battles began with the military. By May 21st, the military and police had retreated to the outskirts of the city, where fighting raged for the next five days.

Free from military rule for the first time in 35 years, a new spirit of liberation spread through the city. Citizens and students set up a

committee to restore order. All weapons were collected, and distributed to those who took responsibility to defend Kwangju. Food was distributed and health needs taken care of by volunteers. A committee was chosen to negotiate with martial law authorities.



Angry demonstrators parading through the street on a captured jeep and truck.

Meanwhile, the Korean military pulled a tight noose around the city. All communications were cut. The government controlled newspapers began carrying stories of "communists" and "north Koreans" trying to take over Kwangju. Kim Dae-jung, the well-known opposition figure, was charged with "instigating" the rebellion.

On May 25th, the Kwangju Citizens Committee requested U.S. Ambassador William Gleysteen to help negotiate with the martial law command. But Gleysteen—acting under orders from the State Department—refused, claiming that the U.S. could not intervene in the internal affairs of Korea.

But on the next day, the U.S. proved willing to intervene on Chun's behalf. To retake Kwangju—and establish absolute authority over the entire nation—Chun needed troops released from the U.S.-Korea Combined Forces Command (CFC). Under the command of U.S. General John

Wickham, the CFC includes 80% of the 600,000 south Korean army and all 40,000 U.S. troops.

In April 1960, when student-led demonstrations led to the overthrow of dictator Syngman Rhee, a similar request for troops was refused by the U.S. But this time around the stakes for the U.S. were higher. Aside from the broader political ramifications of the uprising, Wickham was undoubtedly worried about the air base just outside Kwangju, which is reputed to be the largest nuclear weapons storage site in Korea. On May 26, Wickham authorized the release of some 20,000 troops from the CFC to put down the people of Kwangju. The news of direct U.S. support was broadcast to the people of Kwangju from helicopters, and proclaimed throughout the nation in blazing newspaper headlines.

Within 24 hours the city of Kwangju was assaulted by the Korean Army and quickly retaken. Most of the leaders of the uprising were killed, and hundreds more arrested. More than 3,000 people were left dead.

Within a week of this massacre, President Carter dispatched John Moore, president of the U.S. Export-Import Bank, to Seoul. Moore assured the new military junta that U.S. economic support

would continue, and gave approval for a \$600 million loan to the government to help cover the costs of a nuclear reactor being built by Westinghouse Corporation. With this "seal of approval," the Chun regime had passed its first and most difficult hurdle.

When asked to explain why the U.S. did not offer to help the people of Kwangju, a State Department spokesperson replied: "It is not a human rights issue...It is a question of the national interest of the United States in achieving and maintaining stability in Northeast Asia."

The Korean Economy and Labor

Through the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and commercial banks, the United States has dominated the shaping of south Korea's economic development plan—designed primarily to integrate the export sector into the international division of labor—had led to 30% inflation, a heavy foreign debt, and high unemployment. Combined with massive worker and student unrest generated by Park's repressive rule, the Korean economic situation reached a crisis



Students put the Korean flag over coffins.

level. Park's assassination in October 1979 was interpreted by many political analysts as a ploy to buy time for the failing economy by removing the opposition's main target.

In the period of uncertainty following Park's assassination, foreign capital imports almost stopped, and many foreign companies began to count their profits and run. After taking power with a military coup in May 1980, Chun Doo Hwan began to restructure the economy to fit Korea's assigned role in the "free world" division of labor. A World Bank report in spring 1980 recommended a series of changes, most of which were adopted by the Chun government, as a condition for receiving badly needed bank loans. South Korea was ordered to open its economy even further to multinational corporations, even in sectors previously closed such as consumer goods, pharmaceuticals and insurance. New policies for foreign investment now allow 100% equity in any sector in the economy.

The thrust of the Bank's recommendation was a return to a policy of export orientation, along with cutbacks in wage increases. The report states that "a sustained economic recovery, aside from a number of political adjustments, requires a willingness to make difficult choices and the ability to convince people through political means that a bout of austerity is in their long-term self-interest."

Increased dependence on exports and foreign investment has led south Korea further into the quagmire of a rapidly growing foreign debt. Ranking fourth among the world's largest borrowers, Seoul's foreign debt has reached \$40 billion, double what it was in 1979. With increasing foreign debt comes increasing control on the part of lenders.

Chun's regime has also moved to slow down wage increases won by an increasingly militant labor movement in the mid-1970's. Although wage increases had never kept pace with the cost of living, Chun's propaganda campaign blamed wage in-

creases for inflation and the loss of export competitiveness—a scape-goating tactic familiar to American workers.

In the fall of 1980, Chun and his secret police forced more than 200 of the nation's labor activists to quit their local union posts. In December 1980, some 200 labor union activists were taken to "purification camps" for harsh military training and anti-union propaganda. (See the following section, on "Torture and Purification Camps".)

Revised labor laws, written to put new clamps on the nation's workforce, went into effect on January 1, 1981. Under the new laws, anyone labeled an "outsider" who is charged and convicted for urging someone to join a labor union can be imprisoned for up to three years. An outsider who "manipulates" a strike can be sentenced up to five years. "Outside interference," even from the national union in a local labor dispute is forbidden. Provisions against "outsiders" are directed at Christian labor organizers as well as regional and national union representatives.

The new labor laws also make it nearly impossible for workers to strike; when negotiations have begun in a wage dispute, workers must accept arbitration for a 120-day period prior to striking. The company and the government thus have four months to intimidate workers with arrests, firings and beatings. In addition, the eight hour day was replaced with a 48 hour week.

The new laws require 30 members per worksite to form a union. The previous requirement was two workers. Since 80% of all businesses in south Korea hire less than 30 workers, the vast majority of workers are prohibited from joining unions. Another provision requires that disputes must be undertaken in "the concerned place of business." This restricts the public articulation of demands by a union with a view toward rallying public support or government intervention. In the event of a lockout, workers will be deprived of a legal place to stage a protest, and according to the new

law, the labor dispute will be terminated.

As one Korean labor activist said, "The Korean labor movement has been pushed back ten years."

Workers also face extra-legal barriers to winning basic rights. When a Korean worker is fired for labor activism, her name is circulated to other employers on a "Blacklist." As a result, she will have a very difficult time finding new work. Even if she finds another job, when the company learns of her past dismissal, it will use any pretext to fire her. In October 1983, four women were fired from a textile plant in Inchon, near Seoul. The company had discovered that all four were among 120 women workers fired by the Dong Il Textile Company in 1978 in a labor dispute that received international attention. "Improper ideology" was cited by the company as cause for dismissal.

Torture and "Purification" Camps

In an April 1984 report, "Torture in the Eighties," Amnesty International cited detailed allegations of torture against the south Korean government. Numerous cases of beatings, electric-shock treatments and psychological torture have been documented by the Human Rights Committee of the Korean National Council of Churches.

There is a growing awareness that the regime's ability to employ torture is due in part to the U.S.'s unconditional support. As one victim said: "The U.S. is making money selling us nuclear power plants, electric-shock crowd control equipment and torture machines. There is a growing image—feeding the hatred of the U.S.—that *we are being tortured by Americans.*"

One common torture method is to place a square, wooden stick behind the victim's knees. He is forced to squat, and the torturers stomp on his thighs. Another is to prevent the victim from sleeping for days on end. The most terrible, however, is torture by electric shock.

One young person tortured by the Defense Security Command (military intelligence) remembers his ordeal as follows:

Returning to consciousness after the water torture, I looked around the room confusedly and noticed various strange looking machines. I was stripped naked and hung upside down. Then with a knife they slashed my heels; the blood flowed profusely down my body and even went into my nose. Shortly, they attached something to both my temples and to my fingertips. At that moment, upon receiving the electric shock, I felt my eyes roll backwards and I passed out...

Within one year of Chun's seizure of power, over 200 of the democratic labor movement's dismissed leaders underwent rigorous "training" that included severe drills, hard labor and running for up to seven hours a day.

A first-hand account of the "Purification Camps" was smuggled out by a detainee who had been in the camps for over a year. Of the first days after his arrest, he wrote:

With handcuffs on, we (in group B) were taken to the...Division. From the moment we got out of the trucks we were beaten or kicked unmercifully. Unloaded in an area surrounded by double barbed-wire fences, soldiers with M-16 rifles or light machine guns vigilantly watched over us. We were treated like pigs and dogs. We were trampled on by those heavy army boots, and with heavy clubs the soldiers cracked open heads and broke bones. It was a hellish scene. Over a loudspeaker could be heard a voice saying, "You may kill them! You may kill them!" After hearing this some of us fell to the ground like corpses.

He continued: "Without having

been charged with any criminal offense, we were forced to labor in bitter cold with shovels and pick-axes. It was 20 degrees below zero; sometimes even 30 degrees below zero (Centigrade). The lives of the inmates were full of misery and agony beyond description. It was just like the concentration camps described in novels or movies."

California Ties to South Korea

California's ties to south Korea are substantial, accounting for a large share of the annual trade between the two countries that now totals about \$12 billion. California-based corporations are among the major U.S. investors in Korea. Weapons are shipped from Port Chicago, and nuclear weapons are designed and manufactured for use in Korea at the University of California's Livermore and Los Alamos Labs. As the world's fifth largest importer of U.S. agricultural goods, Koreans eat a lot of California grown food, and California Congressmen and businessmen have been involved in highly publicized scandals related to selling U.S. grains to Korea.

San Francisco Bay's fishing industry is one example of Korea's role in the international division of labor. About 10,000 tons of Pacific herring are fished from the San Francisco Bay in six weeks of mid-

winter, worth \$13 million in 1983. The entire harvest is frozen and shipped to Korea for processing. The eggs are removed and prepared for the markets of Japan, where the roe is sold at high prices as a delicacy. The herring is ground up for fertilizer.¹⁰

Silicon Valley

Fairchild, Integrated Circuits and Signetics are among the Silicon Valley companies with plants and investments in Korea. Fairchild Semiconductor and Signetics invested \$3.5 million and \$4.2 million, respectively, in Korea from 1980-82 to expand their integrated circuit production there. In 1977, 3000 women at the Signetics plant went on a hunger strike for a 46.7% wage hike. A strike would have been illegal, so they stayed in the plant and held a sit-in in the cafeteria. They won a 23% raise, bringing their hourly pay up to a mere \$.48.

Bechtel and Korea's Nuclear Power Program

Another important California investor in Korea is San Francisco-based Bechtel. In April 1984, the story of a federal grand jury probe of alleged bribes of Korean officials by Bechtel made the front page of most of the nation's major newspapers. According to the article released by *Mother Jones* and *Multinational Monitor*, Justice Department and FBI officials "suspect Bechtel of violating the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act between 1978 and 1980 by bribing south Korean officials in order to obtain nuclear construction contracts."¹¹ By one account, the payments and gifts were worth more than \$100,000. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Secretary of State George Schultz—both top Bechtel executives at the time of the alleged bribes, and instrumental in increasing U.S. military commitments to south Korea in their cabinet posts—are suspected of having been aware of the bribes.

With new investments of \$4.5

Continued on page 14



The Kori I nuclear power plant near Pusan, south Korea. The plant began operating in 1978.

Facts About Nuclear Power and Bombs in South Korea

Q: How long has south Korea been involved with nuclear power?

A: Their first research reactor, built by Westinghouse, began operation in 1962 under the "Atoms for Peace" program.

Q: What kind of nuclear power program exists in south Korea?

A: South Korea became known as the "Golden Market" for the nuclear industry with plans to have 42 reactors by the year 2000. Plans have since been revised due to economic difficulties, but south Korea now has one operating plant and eight more under construction. Current plans are for 13 plants in operation by 1991.

Q: Where did south Korea buy its reactors?

A: Six of south Korea's first eight plants were bought from Westinghouse. Four of the six Westinghouse reactors have been engineered by Bechtel Corporation, the Korean government's key advisor on its nuclear power program.

Q: Why Westinghouse and Bechtel?

A: For the first four Westinghouse reactors, the U.S. government's Export-Import Bank (Exim) loaned \$1.9 billion for the purchase of the reactors, fuel and Bechtel engineering. For Westinghouse's contract for two more reactors, Exim threw in a \$1.1 billion package, the largest credit ever authorized by the Exim Bank. Equally important, the State Department has used extraordinary pressure to win contracts for Westinghouse. This first contract was awarded to Westinghouse soon after William Rogers, U.S. Secretary of State, cabled the Seoul embassy in July 1969 to threaten Korean officials "that Exim does not intend to allocate equivalent resources to other projects if this nuclear plant contract is awarded to a non-U.S. supplier." Westinghouse won contracts for its fifth and sixth reactors in south Korea soon after President Carter visited Seoul in June 1979. The reactor contracts, facing heavy competition from a French firm, were a major item of business during Carter's visit. A Westinghouse executive expressed his company's appreciation, saying the U.S. embassy in Seoul has "been the greatest embassy of all the embassies around the world in supporting businesses."

In April 1984, it was revealed that the FBI was investigating Bechtel for

allegedly spending more than \$100,000 to bribe south Korean officials to obtain nuclear construction contracts.²

Q: What about safety and ecology?

A: An April 1982 World Bank report indicates there may be serious safety flaws in south Korea's nuclear power program. It suggests construction schedules have taken precedence over safety measures and quality of personnel. The report notes limited progress on safety problems in the past two years, and that south Korea has no "integrated and complete...nuclear power safety program." Also, south Korea has no comprehensive program for the storage and disposal of radioactive waste.³

Exim and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have made it clear that safety problems are no concern of theirs when exporting reactors abroad.

South Korea's first reactor, Kori I, started up three years late because sea water used in the cooling system caused corrosion. It was closed down due to accidents and malfunctions four times in a two month period in the spring of 1979, and in January 1980 it was closed down again due to a leak in the turbine generator. Kori I is located 52 miles north of Pusan, south Korea's second largest city, on the southern coast. Three million people live within a 52 mile radius of the plant. Eighty percent of south Korea's electricity use is by industry, much of which is concentrated in the southeast where Kori I is located.⁴

Many of the people of the village of Kori make their living from seaweed harvested from the bay. The endless discharge of scalding water from Kori I threatens this source of income.

Q: What does the south Korean public know about the dangers of nuclear power or nuclear weapons?

A: Very little, particularly about nuclear power. Strong government control of the press keeps information from exposing the pending danger. Korean activists say nuclear power, and the potential production of nuclear weapons, is a major concern for the movement, but "until we have democracy there is nothing we can do."

There is a growing concern within the church community as well. At a June 1983 conference of the Presbyterian Church in the Republic of Korea, "people came to understand for the first time that nuclear weapons on our soil are not for Korea's protection. In fact they could actually cause its destruc-

tion!"⁵

In October 1983, the Human Rights Committee of the Korean National Council of Churches sponsored a National Consultation on Human Rights. Besides calling for significant democratic reforms, the participants concluded, "For the survival of the nation, we urge the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons on and around the Korean peninsula."⁶

A new organization formed in Seoul, the Korean Anti-Pollution Organization, has also begun to question the safety of nuclear power plants in one of the world's most densely populated countries.

A hundred thousand Koreans were in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. Korea was a colony of Japan from 1910, and many of Korea's young people were taken to Japan to work in coal mines and factories such as the Mitsubishi shipyards in Hiroshima. Sixty thousand Koreans were killed when the U.S. dropped its A-bombs on those two Japanese cities. An estimated 20,000 Korean survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki now live in south Korea, where they receive no special treatment. The 9000 member Korean Atomic Bomb Casualty Relief Association has taken a public stance against nuclear weapons development in south Korea.

Q: Could south Korea produce its own nuclear weapons?

A: Yes. According to the 1978 Frazer "Koreagate" Congressional report, south Korea decided to build nuclear weapons in the early 1970s.⁷

The U.S. CIA has cited south Korea as a country "most likely and able to proliferate." In 1985, south Korea will be able to produce 36 plutonium bombs every year just using the waste from its reactors!⁸

Q: What is the U.S. posture on nuclear weapons in south Korea?

A: On March 30, 1982 Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger announced that "the U.S. nuclear umbrella" will continue to provide "security" to the Republic of Korea!⁹ Implied with this pledge was a threat to use nuclear weapons against north Korea, south Korea's only direct enemy. In Seoul in January 1983, U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. Meyer re-stated America's first strike threat. He said it would be easier to use nuclear weapons in Korea than in Europe because only

two men would have to make the decision to go nuclear in Korea—Ronald Reagan and Chun Doo Hwan.¹² Nuclear war may be more likely to begin in Korea than in Europe. A recently released Pentagon Five Year Plan includes the possible use of nuclear weapons against north Korea in the event of war with the Soviet Union.

Usually the U.S. defends the build-up of a nuclear arsenal as a needed deterrent against a similarly armed opponent. But in this case, since north Korea has no nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence is not an issue.

TOP FIVE RECIPIENTS OF U.S. EXPORT-IMPORT BANK LOANS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (Inception through Sept. 30, 1982)

(\$ Thousands)

Country	Total loans	Plants financed	U.S. Corporations
South Korea	1,951,185	6	Westinghouse, Bechtel
Spain	991,570	15	Westinghouse, General Electric (GE), Singer, AEC
Taiwan	595,229	6	GE, Westinghouse
Japan	497,151	11	GE, Westinghouse, Allied Chemical, AEC
Philippines	277,200	1	Westinghouse
TOTAL (all countries)	5,371,192	50	

SOURCE: U.S. Export-Import Bank, *Authorizations for Nuclear Power Plants and Training Center, Summary by Country*

Q: Does the U.S. have nuclear weapons in south Korea?

Yes. Estimates are that the U.S. has between 250 and 600 nuclear weapons in south Korea. The U.S. has F-16 and F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers in south Korea, each of which is nuclear capable. Stationed with U.S. troops in south Korea are Lance surface-to-surface missiles, designed specifically to carry nuclear warheads such as the neutron bomb.

Currently 21 atomic demolition munitions (nuclear land mines) are buried within a mile of the Demilitarized Zone between north and south Korea. They would be detonated by remote control if the north's armored forces headed across the DMZ toward Seoul, 40 kilometers away.¹³ This means a first-strike use of nuclear weapons by the U.S. would be unavoidable if there is a conventional war with north Korea.

Q: Could neutron bombs be used in south Korea?

A: Yes. In fact it was in south Korea that the neutron bomb's inventor, Sam Cohen, first conceived it. He has written that had neutron bombs been available during the Korean Civil War, "their application would have represented a highly discriminate attack—far more so than was the attack that actually took place using conventional weapons and which pretty well leveled the city" of Seoul.

The Pentagon is also producing 8-inch neutron artillery rounds that can be used by south Korea's howitzers. Neutron weapons can only be deployed outside the U.S. with the permission of the country involved. Jack Anderson predicts, "Most likely, south Korea will agree to the deployment of neutron bombs."¹⁴

Q: What steps need to be taken?

A: 1. Remove U.S. nuclear weapons from south Korea.

2. End U.S. support and encouragement of south Korea's nuclear power program, which could be used to produce nuclear weapons and is a constant danger to the people of south Korea.

3. Begin diplomatic negotiations with south and north Korea, and other relevant parties, to create a Nuclear Free Zone in Northeast Asia. □

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million in Korea from 1980 to 1982, Bechtel acquired 40% equity in Korea Nuclear Engineering, guaranteeing Bechtel engineering, design, supervision and management of all future nuclear plants in south Korea. Bechtel has engineered four of the six Westinghouse reactors sold to Seoul, and is the key advisor to the Korean government on their nuclear power program. Thus, Bechtel has been the main benefactor of U.S. diplomatic arm-twisting of the Seoul regime to "buy American" in the field of nuclear power. (See the section on nuclear weapons and power.)

Koreagate and California Rice Bribes

In an interview in 1978, Michael Arens of Northern California "conceded that for some time he has been helping certain Asian dictators to remain in power, and has contributed to the destruction of the agricultural production of several friendly developing countries." Arens said he didn't like what was happening.

Arens was a Sacramento Valley rice grower, and a member of the California Rice Growers Association (RGA), which handles about half the rice grown in California by some 2000 rice farmers. About a third of RGA's rice is shipped to foreign countries under the Food for Peace aid program. South Korea has been one of RGA's largest business partners.

In the late 1960's, RGA and the Association's exporting agent paid a Korean businessman, Tongsun Park, over \$8 million in commissions to arrange rice sales to south Korea. Park was later accused of giving \$1 million in bribes to key members of Congress who supported Food for Peace grain shipments, as well as military and other forms of economic support to the government in Seoul. Former California Congressman Richard Hanna of Orange County was charged with 40 counts of conspiracy, bribery, mail fraud and failure to register as a foreign agent.

To add to the scandal, former San Francisco Mayor Joseph Alioto was hired as a "highly paid legal consultant to both RGA and its chief exporter." When Alioto's son bought a shipping company, it immediately

became the sole carrier of RGA rice to Korea.¹³

The influx of cheap, California rice made it possible for the south Korean government to keep the domestic price of rice down—thus thousands of Korean farmers were forced out of business or into debt. Now that a market has been established, and a dependency on imported rice, Korea pays for its California rice in cash.

Koreans In America

The history of Koreans in America can be divided into four periods: (1) the pre-emigration period from 1883 to 1902, during which a Korean diplomatic mission, political exiles, students, and a small number of merchants came to the United States; (2) the official emigration period from 1902 to 1905 when seven thousand Koreans went to the Hawaiian Islands as plantation laborers; (3) the semi-official emigration period between 1905 and 1940, when a few hundred political refugees from Japanese rule, "picture brides" planning to marry earlier male immigrants, and approximately three hundred students with passports from the Japanese government landed in America; and (4) the postwar emigration period after the 1950s, when the Korean population in America increased rapidly.

Within the last ten years, the immigration patterns of Koreans has closely rivaled those of the Latinos and Filipinos. According to the 1980 census, there are over 357,393 Koreans living in the U.S., concentrated primarily in California, Hawaii, New York, and Illinois. A 10 year old Korean child in the U.S. today could be either a newly arrived immigrant or an English speaking fourth generation Korean-American.

For most immigrants who have left south Korea, there is always the dream of "returning home." However, an American education for their children, political freedom, and family reunions take precedent over these personal desires. The Korean communities have also begun to emerge in size with stable institutions—religious, social, cultural and political—reinforcing the notion of permanent residence in the United States.

Similar to other Asian-Americans,

the Korean communities have had to organize themselves to achieve their democratic rights as new American citizens. Some of the major issues that have been taken up in addition to bi-lingual education are: (1) The Chol Soo Lee case, which after a 10-year struggle freed a 30 year old man from false charges of murder; (2) A Unionization drive of Korean janitors at the San Francisco airport who were working at substandard wages with no benefits; (3) Women-related issues like sexual harassment, physical abuse and services for GI brides. Realizing they cannot struggle alone, Koreans have begun to work with other minorities and progressive people demanding jobs, peace, and equality.

Politically, the Korean community has undergone some significant changes in understanding the role of the U.S. government in their homeland. The Kwangju massacre in May 1980, more than any other single event in years, placed U.S. intentions into question. Since that time, more Korean students, businessmen, intellectuals, and Christians have become involved in the struggle for human rights and reunification. It is tradition, now, that every May political activists organize Kwangju commemorations to renew their faith and commitment to their compatriots in Korea. Similarly, Korean Christians and non-Christians internationally have convened overseas conferences on reunification, in hopes of declaring to the world that Korea must be one country. Over the last five years, many Korean Americans have been guests of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea; becoming ambassadors of goodwill and learning about the other half of Korea, which is socialist.

Contrary to most magazine articles that have been portraying Asian Americans as the "model minority", the immigrant community is far from being well integrated in the mainstream of society, and still relates politically and culturally to both Asia and America. Their adjustment will ultimately depend on our support for their human rights in Korea and here as either permanent residents or future American citizens. □

Footnotes

1. Gayn, Mark. *Japan Diary* (New York, 1948), p. 388.
2. Ambrose, Steven E. *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*. Penguin Books, Baltimore, 1971, p. 188.
3. Ambrose. op. cit., p. 189.
4. Ambrose. op. cit., p. 189.
5. Ambrose. op. cit. p. 195.
6. "Korea: 25 Years Later," Cpt. John F. Tarpey, USN (retired), U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August, 1978.
7. Major General Emmett O'Donnell, Jr., commander of the Far Eastern Air Force Bomber Command during the first six months of the war. Testimony on June 25, 1951. Cited in Stone, *Hidden History*, p. 312.
8. Sources for this section on Kwangju include "White Paper on a Popular Uprising in Kwangju," (*Sekai*, Tokyo, Sept. 1981), Catholic Church reports and eyewitness accounts.
9. The information and quotations in the rest of this section are from *Korea Communiqué*, Tokyo, September 1981, p. 6-12.)
10. Lafferty, Elizabeth. "The Bay's Herring," *San Francisco Bay Guardian*, Vol.18, No.17, February 15, 1984.
11. *Mother Jones*, San Francisco, June 1984, p.14. See also the May 1984 *Multinational Monitor* for further details.
12. "Bitter Rice," Ehud Yonay, *New West*, Beverly Hills, California, February 27, 1978, p.50.
13. op. cit. Ehud Yonay, p. 54. □

Korea Resources

cont'd from back cover

Slide Shows and Movies

•All of these are available for showings in Northern California thru the Korea Support Committee.

The Buddha is Smiling. A twenty-three minute slide/tape presentation which explores U.S. nuclear export policies, leading to unsafe reactors and corresponding weapons proliferation risks in India, Pakistan, Taiwan, South Korea and the Philippines. The Center for Development Policy, Washington, D.C.

The Corporate Connection. 75 color slides with 20 minute cassette tape narration with music. Examines multinational corporations active in the United States and south Korea. Committee for a New Korea Policy, Albany, N.Y.

Korea: Time for a Change. Thought and action provoking examination of U.S. policy toward north and south Korea. With recommendations for actions and policy changes. Includes cassette tape and script. American Friends Service Committee. Good discussion starter.

Kwangju Uprising, 1980. Documentary with live footage of May 1980 uprising and massacre. 16 mm. 25 minutes.

Omoni. Two-hour and 15 minutes feature film on the life and struggle of textile workers at Seoul's Peace Market. Produced by Korean residents in Japan. 16 mm.

Other Recommended Publications

Korean Pamphlet Series. Two-sided fliers by Committee for a New Korea Policy on topics ranging from nuclear weapons to U.S. role in Korean reunification. Excellent for study groups and public forums. 100 for \$5.50.

Reports from Kwangju. NACHRK. Intensely moving reports and pictures of events during the Kwangju uprising in May 1980. An excellent resource. 1980. 24 pages. \$1.50.

The Flame of the Workers. A poem about the struggle of south Korean workers in the 1970's. First appeared in March 1978. Author unknown. 23 pp. Translated into English by Cry of the People Committee, Osaka, Japan.

White Paper on a Popular Uprising in Kwangju. Translated by Korea Support Committee from *Sekai* (Tokyo, September 1981). 51 page personal account of the May 1980 uprising. □

What Can You Do?

1. Donate funds, time or other resources to the:

Korea Support Committee
P.O. Box 11425
Oakland, CA 94611
(415) 550-8140

2. Join a Korea Support Committee or start a Korea action group in your city or town.

3. Invite a Korea Support Committee speaker to your school, church, union or organization.

4. Sign petitions and write letters to your Congresspersons supporting the withdrawal of U.S. troops and nuclear weapons and increasing funds for human needs.

5. Request literature, slide shows, film and other resources from the Korea Support Committee. (See *resource list*.)

6. Encourage speakers at events to tie the peace issue with social justice issues in Asia and the Pacific Islands.

7. Send us your name so we can put you on our mailing list. Please in-

clude a telephone number.

8. Endorse the nuclear withdrawal resolution sponsored by Korea support groups around the country.

9. Participate in the campaign to support labor in south Korea. This campaign includes lobbying for legislation to limit the importing of tariff free goods from countries where basic rights of workers are denied.

10. Pass resolutions in your unions opposing tax dollars being spent to aid dictatorial, anti-labor regimes. □

Korea Resources

Periodicals and Newsletters

AMPO. Independent progressive quarterly. In depth reports on politics, economics, culture and peoples' movements in Asia. Includes good coverage of Korea. Seemail \$16/year for individuals, \$24 for institutions (airmail to N. America, add \$2). From AMPO, P.O. Box 5250, Tokyo International, Japan.

Asian Rights Advocate. Information on political and economic repression, resources and action suggestions in support of Christians struggling in south Korea, Philippines and other Asian countries. From Church Committee on Human Rights in Asia, Urban Life Center, 5004 S. Blackstone, Chicago, IL 60615.

Korea Communiqué. A complete source for information and statements from the south Korean human rights movement. Published by Emergency Christian Conference on Korean Problems, c/o NCC-Japan, 2-3-18-24 Nishi Waseda, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 160 Japan.

Korea/Update and Korea/Action. Bimonthly publications of the North American Coalition for Human Rights in Korea. *Update* summarizes recent political, economic and social developments in Korea, and changes in U.S. policies toward Korea. *Action* contains action suggestions, news from Korea-related groups, and descriptions of recent resources. 4-6 pages. \$5/yr. From NACHRK, 110 Maryland Ave., NE, Washington, D.C. 20002.

NACHRK Key Contact. A packet of clippings related to Korea from major newspapers and publications and also recent documents from Korea. Recommended for those who must keep abreast of issues and events. Bi-weekly. 12-20 pages. \$25 per year.

Korea Scope. Collection of articles about recent political and economic developments in Korea, including many translations not available elsewhere. Published by the Interna-

tional Christian Network for Democracy in Korea, Rm. 1538, 475 Riverside Drive, N.Y., N.Y. 10115. \$8 per year.

Monthly Review of Korean Affairs. Scholarly analysis of south Korean human rights and politics. Published by the Council for Democracy in Korea, P.O. Box 3657, Arlington, VA 22203. \$10 per year.

Multinational Monitor. Published by Ralph Nader's Corporate Accountability Resource Group. Good coverage of activities of multinational corporations in the U.S. and the Third World, including South Korea. \$18/yr. for individuals; \$25 for non-profit institutions. From Multinational Monitor, P.O. Box 19405, Washington, D.C. 20036

Books

Baldwin, Frank, ed. *Without Parallel: The American-Korean Relationship Since 1945.* Pantheon Books, 1973. 376 pp. Seven excellent studies: U.S. occupation policy, Korean War, south Korean economy, peasants, repression.

Cumings, Bruce. *The Origins of the Korean War.* Princeton University Press, 1981. Best source on U.S. occupation of south Korea, 1945-47. Extensive documentation. Traces causes of the Korean Civil War to this period.

De la Court, Thijs, et al. *The Nuclear Fix* World Information Service on Energy, 1982. A guide to nuclear (power and bombs) activities in the Third World. From WISE-Washington, Rm. 553, 1346 Connecticut Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. 20036. Four concise pages on Korea. \$9.95 including postage.

Kim Chi Ha. *The Gold-Crowned Jesus and Other Writings.* 1978. Powerful collection of poetry by Korea's most popular poet. Preface by eds. Chong Sun Kim and Shelley Killen. Illustrations by George Knowlton, 150 pp. \$5.95. From Orbis Books, Maryknoll, N.Y. 10545.

Kim Chi Ha. *The Middle Hour: Selected Poems of Kim Chi Ha.* Translated by David McCann.

Published by Human Rights Working Group. 1980. 88 pp. \$5.00. Available through NACHRK.

Lee, Sun-ai and Don Luce, eds. *The Wish: Poems of Contemporary Korea.* Poems written by farmers, workers, children, and men and women of Korea. Friendship Press, N.Y. 1983 72 pp. \$6.95. P.O. Box 37844, Cincinnati, OH 45237.

Mattielli, Sandra, ed. *Virtues in Conflict: Tradition and the Korean Women Today.* History, plus current situation of south Korean women. Samwha Publishing Co., Seoul. 1977.

McCormack, Gavan and Mark Selden, eds. *Korea, North and South: The Deepening Crisis.* (Monthly Review Press, 1978.) Recommended as basic text to understand south and north Korea, international pressures on south Korea, and issues related to reunification.

Stone, I.F. *The Hidden History of the Korean War.* Monthly Review Press, 1970. Detailed inquiry into events surrounding the Korean Civil War. Raises questions about the origins of the war, and shows how the American military and south Korean oligarchy did their best to drag out and disrupt peace talks. Met with almost complete press blackout and boycott in the U.S. in 1952 when it originally appeared.

Sunoo, Harold Hakwon. *America's Dilemma in Asia: The Case of South Korea.* Documentation of how the U.S. has systematically thwarted Korean democracy for over three decades. Nelson-Hall Publisher. Chicago. 1979.

T.K. *Letters from South Korea.* Eloquent, personal journal of the human rights struggle, originally serialized in *Sekai*, a leading Japanese monthly magazine. Also includes Kim Chi Ha's "Declaration of Conscience" and human rights chronology. IDOC America, 1976. 428 pp. \$5.00. Available through NACHRK.

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