2. DURING OUR DISCUSSION ON THE PLANE JUNE 29, THE SECRETARY GAVE ME THE GIST OF THE MESSAGE I SHOULD TAKE BACK TO CHUN. HE HAS SEEN AND GENERALLY APPROVED THE FOLLOWING DRAFT WHICH I HAVE MODIFIED SLIGHTLY TO REFLECT HIS SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS. THE FINAL VERSION SHOULD OF COURSE HAVE STATE, DEFENSE, AND NSC CONCURRENCE.

3. BEGIN QUOTE FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY:

3. SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS TO SEE GENERAL CHUN. AS YOU KNOW FROM OUR DISCUSSION ON THE PLANE TO YOKOTA, I WANT YOU TO SEE GENERAL CHUN DOO HWAN (M-RI CHUN TU-HWAN) ONCE AGAIN TO EMPHASIZE THAT WHILE OUR SECURITY COMMITMENT TO THE ROK IS FIRM, CHUN AND HIS GROUP ARE ABUSING THAT COMMITMENT IN WAYS THAT WILL UNDERMINE KOREA'S LONG-TERM STABILITY. IN TALKING TO CHUN YOU SHOULD REAFFIRM OUR SECRET

END QUOTE.
SECRET

4. SECURITY COMMITMENT FORCEFULLY BUT INDEED A LACK OF CONFIDENCE THAT I WAS HAVING TO ESTABLISH GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE ANDchin be consistent with our MUTUAL SECURITY INTERESTS.

SUGGEST YOU TELL CHUN THAT YOU HAD A THOROUGH POLICY DISCUSSION WITH ME DURING WHICH YOU GAVE ME AN ACCOUNT OF YOUR LAST CONVERSATION WITH HIM, YOU SHOULD THEN SAY I HAVE INSTRUCTED YOU TO CONVEY THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- A. THE COMMITMENT OF THE U.S. TO THE SECURITY OF THE ROK IS STRONG, WE HAVE GONE OUT OF OUR WAY TO WARN THE NORTH KOREANS AGAINST MILITARY ADVENTURE, AND WE HAVE TRIED TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE THAT WE ARE CONTINUING TO PLAY THIS PROTECTIVE ROLE AGAINST EXTERNAL DANGER.

-- B. NEVERTHELESS, WE BELIEVE THE AUTHORITIES IN KOREA HAVE ABUSSED THIS AMERICAN COMMITMENT IN THEIR EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH CONTROL.

-- C. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT LONG-TERM KOREAN STABILITY AND SECURITY OF THE REGION REQUIRE THAT ANY KOREAN GOVERNMENT ACHIEVE LEGITIMACY AND POSITIVE SUPPORT OF ITS OWN PEOPLE. THE CURRENT AUTHORITIES ARE SEEKING TO GAIN LEGITIMACY IN WAYS IN WHICH WE HAVE NO CONFIDENCE.

-- D. THE FUTURE OF THE US/ROK RELATIONSHIP WILL DEPEND ON THE NEW AUTHORITIES GAINING LEGITIMACY IN WAYS IN WHICH THE U.S. DOES HAVE CONFIDENCE.

-- E. ACTIONS AND NOT WORDS WILL DETERMINE THE DEGREE OF SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
3. SENSE OF CONGRESS RESOLUTION: Lee Hamilton would like to put together a sense of Congress resolution that would affirm our security commitment to South Korea, but at the same time express deep concern over recent political developments and the interruption of political liberalization. Hamilton specifically asked that I seek your views on the usefulness of such a resolution, and whether it would be helpful to include a reference to Kim Dae Jung and other arrested political leaders.

4. NORTH KOREA POLICY: Willicent Fenwick and Tony Bilerson, noting the dangers inherent in trying to use our security relationship as leverage to moderate the tough line the generals are now pursuing, wondered about the possibility of making, or at least considering, a change in our long-standing posture toward North Korea as a way of mounting leverage. They recognized that such a change should not be made lightly, and they accepted our points that the North Korea Card is somewhat flanked as leverage in that it would not be reversible once played, and that it would risk alienating many in South Korea who share our opposition to the direction in which the generals are currently headed. Nevertheless Fenwick in particular was intrigued by the idea of telling Chun Doo Hwan that under certain circumstances we might find it necessary to review our long-standing refusal to talk to the North without the ROK present in order to protect our interests in the peninsula.

5. Please let me have your reactions to these suggestions, neither of which is being discussed outside this channel at this time.

Huskie