

AMPO

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五大陸の民衆と連帯しよう

'80s: WHERE JAPAN STANDS

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Rushing Towards Remilitarization

by Fujii Haruo

Introduction

Japan's reestablished military — the Self Defense Forces — is, like the armed forces maintained by any country, designed to protect the present Japanese ruling system, i.e., monopoly capitalism.

• Due to its defeat in World War II, Japan's "great imperial army" was dissolved. Immediately after the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950, however, General Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief of the occupation army, ordered the Japanese government to establish a national police reserve force.

An immediate duty to be fulfilled by the police reserve force was to engage in maintenance of public peace in Japan, since the U.S. troops stationed in Japan for that purpose were dispatched to the Korean peninsula. During the conflict in Korea, Japan served both as a dispatch base for U.S. operations in Korea, and as a supply base. U.S. military headquarters for the Korean war were located in Japan, there were many U.S. bases on Japanese soil, and the families of U.S. soldiers were living here. Not only was it the task of the police reserve force to protect them, it was also expected to eventually develop into a new Japanese

army.

The Self Defense Forces (SDF) comprised of Ground, Maritime and Air forces, were created according to the 1954 reorganization of the police reserve force, and were given the additional task of defending the nation against foreign attack. In other words, regardless of its name, the SDF actually took on the same functions as the militaries of other countries.

The role of the SDF was to combat both domestic and foreign enemies, and to achieve these ends, it was to be mobilized both for external defense and internal security. In this way, a military was revived in Japan, equipped with both a military function against foreign countries and one to maintain domestic peace and order by fighting against the enemy within the structure of Japanese monopoly capitalism, i.e., the Japanese people themselves.

In the more than 27 years since its establishment, this military has tread the inevitable path of self-induced expansion, according to the unwritten law of military power development in imperialistic countries. After instituting four long-term plans for reinforcement of the SDF's military power, the Japanese Defense Agency adopted in 1977 a system patterned after the U.S. method of reviewing a five-year plan

every three years. This review process is called an interim work assessment. The first such assessment was decided upon in 1978 (1978 Interim Work Assessment) and the second one is scheduled to be completed shortly (1981 Interim Assessment).

The national defense budget now amounts to 2 trillion, 400 billion yen, the 8th largest in the world. The countries superseding Japan in terms of their military budget are the five nuclear-armed ones, together with West Germany and Saudi Arabia.

The total strength of the SDF is 240,000 men consisting of 155,000 men in ground forces, 42,000 men in Maritime forces with war vessels totaling 220,000 tons, 44,000 men in the Air force with 750 aircraft. Japan is thus equipped with the strongest, most modern arms in the world in terms of conventional weaponry, and quality-wise with the strongest in Asia. Also, since Japan has a population of 116.5 million and its GNP is \$115 trillion, its latent fighting strength is great both in personnel and materiel.

Present Focal Point: The Korean Peninsula

In the 1950s the SDF, while taking charge of domestic security, worked towards strengthening its basic defensive capabilities, and gradually took over the ground defense role from the U.S. military in Japan. The troop strength of the U.S. armed forces in Japan as of April 1952 (excluding those stationed in Okinawa) was 260,000, but with the truce ending Korean War hostilities, it gradually decreased and in 1957 U.S. ground combat troops were completely withdrawn from mainland Japan. At this point the ground defense role was transferred to the SDF.

During this period, in 1952 the Maritime Security Forces were formed and in 1954 were transformed into the Maritime Self Defense Force. However, the maritime and air forces were still in a formative period in the 50s, still heavily dependent on the U.S. military.

From 1958 to 1960 the first-phase defense power reinforcement plan was carried out, through which the framework of the SDF as a military was built. With the conclusion in 1960 of the new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (a military alliance) as a start, the SDF's external function was defined and strengthened. The focus of its external task was then directed towards the Korean peninsula. It was in 1963 that the Defense Agency's Joint Staff Council confidentially conducted what became known as the "Mitsuya Study." This study was designed to examine measures the SDF and Japanese government were to take, based on the assumption that a second Korean War would break out. The then U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatrick stated around that time that he would expect Japan "to be equipped with enough monitoring power to protect the area, including a part of the Korean peninsula, in the future."

The U.S. used Japan during the Korean War as a sortie and supply base. For the U.S., Japan and south Korea were one defense zone, and the U.S. forces stationed in Japan and south Korea were considered as one body. It was under this perception by the U.S. forces that the SDF and south Korean military were developed. In the early 60s, the U.S. began discussing

a large-scale cutback in U.S. troop strength in south Korea and adopted a plan which would encourage Japan to take over the responsibility.

With the conclusion of a Normalization Treaty between Japan and south Korea in 1965, the political, economic and diplomatic relationship between the two countries was strengthened. Strong resistance among the Japanese people against a direct military tie-up, however, necessitated that the south Korean military and Japan's SDF continue their cooperation only indirectly, with the U.S. military as mediator. In 1968, however, high military officials of both countries began visiting each other and a system of information exchange between the two was established.

In 1969 a U.S.-Japan joint communique was issued which stated that "the security of south Korea is important for the security of Japan itself," thus placing upon Japan the expectation that it would take over from the U.S. responsibility for south Korea's defense. Then, between 1970 and 1971, one division of U.S. ground troops was withdrawn from south Korea.

In the meantime, during the high economic growth period in the 60s, the military power of the Maritime and Air Defense Forces was greatly expanded. By 1965 the 20,000-strong U.S. intercept units had been withdrawn from Japan's mainland. Then in 1970 the U.S. air force's attack squadrons were also moved out of the Japanese mainland. The Air Self Defense Force took over the air defense role with F104J's being put into commission, and then with delivery of the F4EJ it took over much of the responsibility in the field of strategic attack.

The military power of the Maritime Defense Force was also strengthened. At about 1961, after the first-phase defense strengthening plan had been completed, the war vessels in commission totaled 110,000 tons, with which the maritime force was expected to be responsible for (1) *guarding* of the sea area around Japan and (2) defense of major ports and straits. However, according to the third-phase defense plan beginning in 1967, its roles were assumed to be (1) reinforcement of *defense* power for the sea around Japan and (2) improvement of securing the safety of marine traffic.

"The surrounding sea area" according to the Defense Agency was then considered the area extending 300 nautical miles from the Japanese coastline (about 555 kilometers). In the early 60s this area was to be "guarded," and in the late 60s its "defense" was the responsibility of the maritime defense force. Then in the 70s, the surrounding waters expanded to the area several hundred to 1,000 nautical miles off the coast of Japan. The defense authorities explained that the surrounding area for the protection of sea lanes is 1,000 nautical miles and for sea area in general, excluding sea lanes, is several hundred nautical miles. In any case a strategically important sea area in the northwestern Pacific was to be covered by the Maritime Defense Force. The area in question naturally includes the sea and air around the Korean peninsula.

With this clearly in mind, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger stated, in appreciation of Japan's efforts, that "Japan is already playing an indirect role

in the defense of south Korea. The defense capacity provided by Japan's Air Defense Force is effective not only for the Japanese mainland but for the defense of south Korea."

Towards U.S.-Japan-South Korea Joint Defense

Since the late 1970s the SDF's attitude toward relations with south Korea became even more clear and positive. At the end of July 1979 the then director-general of the Defense Agency visited south Korea, becoming the first to do so while in active service. In October of the same year President Park Chung Hee was assassinated and the situation in south Korea became very unstable. In May 1980 martial law was extended throughout south Korea, and through armed suppression of the people's uprising in Kwangju, the dictatorial Chun Doo Hwan military regime was established.

In the White Paper on Defense published on August 5 by the Japanese Defense Agency immediately after the Kwangju incident and Chun's rise to power, the statement concerning the military situation in the Korean peninsula changed greatly from the corresponding statement published the previous year. It stated that "to maintain peace and stability in the Korean peninsula is urgently required for Japan's security." Whereas the 1979 Defense White Paper had stated "it has an important relation to Japan's security," this was changed in 1980 to "an urgently required" necessity.

The 1980 White Paper also stated appreciated for U.S. President Carter's decision to freeze the previously-planned withdrawal of U.S. ground troops from south Korea, as "a measure appreciative for our country's needs." As this point illustrates, ever since the withdrawal of U.S. ground troops from south Korea became an issue in 1977 the Japanese military's attitude toward south Korea has been expressed vocally and without hesitation. The Defense Agency strongly requested that the U.S. take measures to maintain a military balance on the Korean peninsula, stating that "the presence of the U.S. troops in south Korea is essential for deterrence" of the north.

In return for acceding to this request the U.S. naturally demanded compensation from Japan. One form of compensation was for Japan to share the expense of U.S. troops stationed in Japan. This "sympathetic share" began in fiscal 1978, and amounted then to 6.2 billion yen. The amount increased rapidly to 43.5 billion yen in fiscal 1981. In addition, 165 billion yen (\$750 million) was born by Japan for the maintenance of the U.S. bases in Japan. (FY1979) Furthermore, the amount of funded military supplies (FMS) and general military-related imports increased suddenly from 1978. The majority of these were purchased from the United States, amounting to 27.8 billion yen in 1977, and increasing rapidly to 108 billion yen and 107.5 billion yen in 1978 and 1979, respectively.

With the foregoing developments in mind, the military relationship between Japan and south Korea to 1977 can be seen as two stages. The first is the period between 1950 and 1965; the second phase causing after the conclusion of the Japan-south Korean treaty,

and lasting until 1977.

In November 1978 a Japan-U.S. Defense Co-operative Guideline was set up by the two governments, based on the U.S.-Japan security treaty. This Guideline stipulated that the SDF constitutes the major force and the U.S. troops a supplementary role in matters concerning the defense of Japan. The Guideline went further, however, in expanding the area to be jointly covered by the defense forces of the U.S. and Japan to include the entire "Far East." It was within the context of this guideline that the director general of the Defense Agency visited south Korea, as mentioned earlier. The third phase of the Japan-south Korean security relationship thus began in 1978, and continues to this day.

Following the July 1979 decision to freeze the withdrawal of U.S. ground troops from south Korea, Japan was further drawn into assisting in south Korea's defense. This trend continued in 1980, with the appearance of the Chun Doo Hwan regime in south Korea, and the Ronald Reagan administration in the U.S. These reactionary governments are promoting trilateral military cooperation, including Japan, requiring that Japan go beyond mere sharing of expenses for U.S. troops, increased imports from the U.S., and extending economic aid to south Korea. Japan is now being drawn into a higher degree of cooperation vis-a-vis south Korea's defense.

Chun Doo Hwan, having been invited as President Reagan's first foreign guest, met with Reagan in February 1981. Their joint communique, promising increased cooperation, was followed by a Suzuki-Reagan meeting in May, during which the two confirmed in another joint communique that the U.S. and Japan will share mutually agreed-upon roles for promoting the maintenance of peace in the Korean peninsula, and for securing peace and stability in the Far East. Premier Suzuki promised that Japan would improve its defensive power in its surrounding sea and air space, and that it would strengthen its assistance to the region, recognizing the importance of these for keeping peace and stability in the world - in other words economic cooperation for security.

As if expecting this result, south Korean president Chun Doo Hwan expressed his appreciation for the Japan-U.S. joint communique and requested from Japan "a higher-level of economic assistance based on the concept of a fate-sharing community" (in an interview with a delegation of Jiji Tsushin press service reporters on May 15.) In the interview Chun stated that "The time has come for Japan to realistically accept the view on regional security shared by the U.S. and south Korea and to consider readjustment of its policy." He further stated that "Japan's strengthening of its maritime forces and air early warning system will supplement the regional security system of the south Korean and U.S. militaries stationed in Korea," thereby expressing his strong expectation that Japan would strengthen its national defense.

Direct military cooperation between Japan and south Korea is being strengthened considerably. During 1980, for example, the number of high-ranking SDF officers who visited south Korea totaled 12 in six trips, and that of south Korean military officers totaled 94 in 30 trips to Japan. In September

1981 five students of the south Korean military academy visited Japan's Defense Academy for the first time, staying for five days and sharing room and board to deepen their exchange. The first visit by a south Korean training fleet to Japan is scheduled to take place within the year. The south Korean military expects to maintain an even deeper exchange with Japan in various fields including information, personnel, training and strategy.

South Korea's internal contradictions are deepening into a general crisis, and the present ruling system cannot be maintained without strengthening its military dictatorship. It is the Japanese ruling class which is most aware of this fact. These forces in Japan are trying, therefore, to secure Japan's imperialistic interests by supporting the military dictatorial regime and by redefining the Japan-south Korean relationship as a "fate-sharing community."

From Maritime Defense to Overseas Dispatchment

As mentioned earlier, the Maritime Self Defense Force took the role of defense of the sea area 300 nautical miles around Japan in the 60s and this area was expanded to 1,000 nautical miles in the 70s. The sea lanes that the SDF is in charge of are the south eastern lane originating from Tokyo and the south western one to the north of the Philippines originating from Osaka, respectively covering 1,000 nautical miles. In the 1980s the U.S. has begun to ask Japan to defend the sea areas stretching 2,500 kilometers, as far as Guam. U.S. Secretary for Defense Weinberger requested of foreign minister Ito, when the latter visited the U.S. in March 1981, that Japan bear responsibility for the defense of the northwestern Pacific waters to the west of Guam and to the north of the Philippines. This request was not only for the defense of specific sea lanes but for the entire ocean area.

From late February 1980, the Maritime Self Defense Forces participated in the RIMPAC (Pacific Rim) maneuvers conducted around Hawaii for three weeks. These joint maneuvers participated in by the navies of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand led by the U.S. navy - are said to have been held to counter an expansion of the Soviet navy on one hand, and to defend sea lanes in the Pacific and Indian Oceans jointly by these five countries.

Defense of sea lanes is meaningless unless straits, port facilities and pipelines are also defended, and a supply of resources has been secured. In the case of oil, if the Straits of Hormuz were to be blocked, defending sea lanes would be of no help to Japan. If the supply of main resources were stopped, military force to secure maritime traffic would become useless.

Accordingly, the real aim of defense of maritime traffic is to secure the flow of resources by military power, and unless this is done, its aims will not be complete. During the Iran-Iraq war, formation of a joint fleet to secure free traffic in the Straits of Hormuz was discussed, led by the U.S.

A naval fleet shows its superiority over others in terms of its ability to conduct long-distance operations. Accordingly, among the SDF the Maritime Self

Defense Force is showing the most active attitude in overseas actions. An article entitled "The Defense Level Japan Should Be Equipped With" written by a uniformed group (July 1980 issue, *Shokun*) proposes that Japan should be equipped with four attack-type aircraft carriers and 17 small-sized aircraft carriers of the 20,000 ton-level. This plan is designed to threaten Third World Countries with an attack-type aircraft carrier fleet, while protecting sea lanes with an escort fleet consisting of small-sized aircraft carriers. Clearly, an entire navy would be required along with these carriers.

Appropriately, in a report published by the Research Institute for Peace and Security, an auxiliary organ of the Defense Agency, it is stated that for Japan's defense it is necessary "to have a strategic capability to effectively block activity on an enemy's waters," and "to maintain the capability to pursue an air strategy over seas, especially air attack power and an amphibious battle capability." In other words, they want to have aircraft carriers and a marine force.

The Japan-U.S. security treaty had a lend-lease nature when it was concluded in 1960, whereby the U.S. could use bases in Japan in exchange for "the safety of the Far East." Later, as the military power of the SDF was strengthened, the SDF share of defense responsibility was also expanded. In the Sato-Nixon joint communique announced in 1969 it was expressed that Japan would be actively involved in securing "the safety of the Far East."

In the Tanaka-Ford joint statement which followed, issued in 1974, it was confirmed that both Japan and the U.S. would play a role for the stability of Asia as "Pacific nations." At just about the same time the Defense Agency made it clear that Japan's defense power would take on the role of contributing to the stability and peace of Asia. In the Ohira-Carter joint statement announced in May 1979, it was specified that "cooperation and discussions would be deepened between the two nations concerning various problems in Asia and other regions in the world." It referred, for the first time in a U.S.-Japan joint communique, to the stability of the "Middle East and the Gulf area" and to an expansion of Japan's cooperation in order to achieve this stability.

In this manner, the Japan-U.S. security treaty and the SDF have changed in their content to Japan-U.S. military cooperation throughout Asia - indeed, on a world scale - rather than their original functions for the safety of Japan.

Then premier Hatoyama clearly stated in June 1955, concerning the role of the SDF that "it cannot do anything other than the protection of Japan's land." Late premier Ikeda also stated in March 1964 that the limit of the SDF's military action "must be limited, in principle, to be within Japan."

However, as the strategic capacity of the SDF has been strengthened, the Japanese government changed its view greatly in the middle of the 1960s concerning limits on movement and overseas dispatchment of the SDF. In 1966 the definition of forbidden SDF overseas dispatchment was decided upon as: "to dispatch armed troops to the land, sea or air of the territory of another country for the purpose of use of arms." Then in March 1969, it was stated that

"overseas dispatchment of the SDF shall not be a special problem on the open seas." Thus, an SDF action on the open seas and in open air had no restriction.

On May 14, 1971 an overseas dispatchment was defined by Cabinet Committee member of the House of Representative, director general of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau Takatsuji, as "actually establishing a state of control by armed forces by sending a conventional strength of arms on a hostile country." This meant that bombing and temporary armed intervention on foreign territory was possible if it was interpreted as an exercise of the right of self defense.

Strong Latent Military Power

The military power of Japan's Maritime and Air Self Defense Forces are far superior in quality to the naval and air forces of other Asian countries.

Looking at the military power structure of the south and north in the Korean peninsula, for instance, their respective armies have been overwhelmingly emphasized, and their naval and air forces are relatively weak. Their naval war ships total 60,000 tons for the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, and 80,000 tons for the Republic of Korea (1980), which is about the same size as Japan's Maritime Safety Agency fleet. As for the strength of their air forces, as of 1980 the north has 250 supersonic strategic planes, the south has 280 planes, but Japan has 325 (with an additional 122 planes on order).

The SDF promoted domestic development of basic military equipment in the 1960s, producing the model 60 armored vehicle, model 61 tanks, model 62 machine guns, model 64 rifles and model 64 anti-tank guided missiles one after another. ("model 60" indicates the year that equipment was adopted for SDF use, 1960.)

In addition to these domestically-developed weapons, others were imported from the U.S., with U.S.-developed technology such as the F104 jet fighter planes and the BADGE (Base Air Defense Ground Environment) system in the early half of the 50s, and in the latter half of the 60s Mike and Hawk anti-air missiles and the Phantom F4EJ fighter plane were introduced.

In the 70s this equipment was gradually replaced by even more updated material. The model 73 armored car, model 74 tank, model 74 self-propelled 105 millimeter cannon, and model 75 self-propelled cannons appeared in successive years. In the naval area, a 4,700 ton escort ship loaded with helicopters was introduced, as well as a tear-drop-typed vessel similar in shape to nuclear-powered vessels appeared. During the same period the domestically produced C1 transport plane and T2 jet training planes were introduced, in addition to the domestically manufactured Phantoms. In 1975 mass production of the F1 fighter - remodeled from the T2 trainer - was begun as a ground-support plane. This was followed by the decision to produce the F15 Eagle under license as the new major fighter plane.

Japan's latent military power is considerable. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries which is currently producing tanks, can rapidly increase its production

capacity 20 times if it shifts into full operation. Similarly, Japan's shipbuilding industry, boasting as the number one in the world, has a construction capacity of 10 million tons per year. By turning only a part of this capacity to the production of war vessels, Japan could immediately become a strong naval nation.

Furthermore, SDF officers and hawkish business and political leaders are demanding that the U.S. be permitted to bring nuclear arms into Japan, and even that the SDF be equipped with nuclear arms. Immediately after the Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperative Guidelines were decided upon in November 1978, top-ranking officials of the SDF stated that Japan "should naturally have its own ideas 'concerning the use of arms exclusively for attack including nuclear arms', and should discuss these ideas with the U.S." (November 30, 1978, *Yomiuri Shimbun*) If nuclear arms are deployed in Japan, they argue, Japan can have a bigger voice in mutual defense discussions. This process makes clear once again that military defense thinking which depends on simple power theories cannot help but lead eventually to the nuclear arms option.

The SDF began lobbying in 1955 for the need to maintain an anti-nuclear defense capability. Since that time, the design structure of tanks and armored vehicles have all been made secret, and escort ships have all been equipped with radioactive waste cleaning devices. From the beginning of the 60s transport devices both for nuclear and non-nuclear arms have been deployed. A primary emphasis was placed on nuclear defenses so that the SDF could participate in joint operations with the U.S. even in the event nuclear weapons being used. The SDF's logic was one of self-protection while ensuring continued cooperation with the U.S. Subsequently, the SDF itself began to be equipped with the capacity to handle and use nuclear weapons. Transport measures were prepared so as to be able to use nuclear arms anytime as soon as nuclear warheads were introduced. In this manner, a foundation for U.S.-Japan joint operations, mainly centering around U.S. nuclear arms, has been laid.

In addition to these measures, some people in Japan even began to propose that Japan prepare to maintain an independent nuclear armament capability. In a research paper published in May 1981 by the Peace & Security Research Institute, commissioned by the Defense Agency, entitled "Progress of Military Science Technology and Japan's Defense Scheme (A Policy Study)," it was stated that "Aside from the political judgement on whether Japan would decide to start nuclear armament or not, study and research concerning nuclear facilities and rocket facilities must proceed under strict civilian control." Simply put, this paper is advocating that the SDF should start research into nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

Reviving the Japanese Military

It was the U.S. occupation army that ordered Japan to set up the SDF in the early 1950s, and it was officers of the former Imperial Japanese army

that took charge of rebuilding the military. At the founding of the Police Reserve Force, of an initial membership of 74,768 men, 5,463 were those with a background as military officers. However, regular officers who had graduated from the former Army Academy and Naval Academy were purged as war criminals. After the purge orders against them were later lifted, graduates of former military academies were employed. The number of those graduates employed in the Police Reserve Force amounted to 5,135 in 1957, constituting 20 per cent of the high-ranking officers. However, one after another they retired upon reaching the age limit and now there are only 200 such officers above the rank of colonel.

Instead, graduates of the Defense Academy who have been trained by former officials are now forming the core of the SDF leadership, filling the regimental commander class. Training and education for key officers are carried out by the National Defense Academy and National Defense Medical College, and the air, maritime and ground officer candidate schools provide training for selected students from the National Defense Academy, graduates of general universities, and selected sergeants for about one year. These students then will be given training for specialized skills according to their required roles both on elementary and advanced levels and for troop management in total of about one year. There are two courses in the Ground, Maritime and Air Staff Colleges for training higher-ranking staff: one a general staff course (CGS) and the other an advanced general staff course (AGS). These courses are equivalent to training at army, naval and air force academies.

As of April 1980, the number of high-ranking SDF officers ranked by educational background is as follows: those graduating from former military academy number 200, those from the National Defense Academy number 87,000, those from general universities 9,100, those from junior colleges 1,500, high school graduates number 13,200 and junior high school graduates number 5,200.

The SDF and old Japanese Imperial military are the same in nature. Both are standing armies of an imperialist country with professional officers as their core. The old army started as "a standing army for the Imperial Court," at first being defined as "a tool for suppressing the country," and in the year Meiji 21 (1888) it was changed from a garrison to a divisional formation, with a shift in function to an armament against other countries. The process of the reorganization and growth from the Police Reserve Force to the SDF has the same nature as the history of the military build-up in the Meiji era.

Through the enactment of the draft law of 1872 and later revisions, universal conscription was made into national policy, but it was an empty policy without creating a national army in substance. Although the SDF is different from the old army in the sense that it is based entirely on a voluntary system, it is stronger in its mercenary character for use by the ruling class.

The primary difference between the SDF and the old Imperial army is that the former has no constitutional ground for its existence. There is at present no constitutional regulation concerning a dec-

laration of war, reconciliation, the functions of a supreme command, and even concerning the formation of the SDF itself. These points are stipulated only in the SDF Law, a system having no parallel in other countries. The supreme command position in the old army rested with the emperor. In the case of the SDF, the prime minister is regarded as the person who has the right of highest command and supervision covering military orders and military policy. However, the relationship between the emperor and the SDF is currently growing stronger. One of the most important issues in the proposed revision of the constitution is to change the status of the emperor from merely a symbol to the head of state, a change with devious implications for the SDF as well.

Officers and non-commissioned officers are under a long-term service system, but soldiers are under a term-system of two or three years. There are 30,000 soldier vacancies in the ground forces. Even if the military budget is increased, as currently planned, unless enough soldiers are recruited, the force cannot function as a viable military power. If an emergency happened, there would naturally be casualties and deserters. For these reasons serious consideration was given to the necessity of reviving a draft system to drive young people compulsorily into the military in time of war. Before the Pacific War men between 19 and 45 were forced to serve in the military according to the military service law. The population of this age stratum now totals 25 million. If only four per cent of them were to be recruited as is done in West Germany, a military of one million men would immediately be created.

Moreover, in order to actually use such an enormous latent military power in wartime, promotion for war-time legislation began which would allow the compulsory use of workers for arms production and military transport. In July 1978 the then chairman of the joint staff council Kurusu Hiroomi raised this issue and ever since, successive cabinets have been steadily promoting it.

To accomplish this, the government, the Liberal Democratic Party and financial circles began actively working toward revision of the constitution to incorporate these militaristic changes. From the beginning of the '70s the government and the defense authorities have put much of their energy into forming a "national consensus" on the need to maintain the Self-Defense Forces. Then from 1978 they have tried hard to form a consensus concerning the actual use of the Self Defense Forces. With "the threat of the Soviet Union," as their excuse, they have stressed that the SDF must be made a "fighting force" for national defense. Their ultimate target is to complete preparations for a "nation able to fight" by creating a system capable of meeting an emergency. Their goal is to equip Japan with an "active military power" capability by the mid-80s to prepare for crises faced by Japan's monopoly interests in the Third World.