BOX 2, FILE 7 (1979-1980)
Ambassador Gleysteen’s discussions with Chun Doo Hwan; Kim Dae Jung’s role in politics; the pace of democratization.
These documents written by US Ambassador William Gleysteen are primarily from 1979 and the summer and fall of 1980. They include his notes about discussions with Chun Doo Hwan, Kim Dae Jung’s role in politics, the process of democratization, and other topics. In one significant cable, Secretary of State Muskie discusses the possibility, suggested by some lawmakers, of trying to pressure Chun by changing US policy towards North Korea.
11/29/1979 – US Embassy reports on Washington on police deployments in Seoul following the assassination of Park Chung Hee and the declaration of martial law.
3/14/1980 – Gleysteen tells Richard Holbrooke that he is about to send Holbrooke his assessment of Chun but wants to show it to General John Wickham and Bob Brewster [the CIA Station Chief in Seoul] before he sends it. This is significant because it shows how deeply the CIA was in crafting US policy in Korea at the time.
5/3/1980 – Discussion of US-ROK policy planning talks.
6/30/1980 – Secret (NODIS) guidance to Ambassador Gleysteen from Secretary of State Muskie on the US approach to Chun Doo Hwan. It includes a blunt warning: “I want you to see General Chun Doo Hwan once again to emphasize that while our security commitment to the ROK is firm, Chun and his group are abusing that commitment in ways that will undermine Korea’s long-term stability. In talking to Chun you should reaffirm our security commitment forcefully but indicate a lack [of] confidence that what he and his group are doing to establish a government that will have the support of the Korean people and thus be consistent with our mutual security interests.”
[DATE UNCERTAIN – Probably early June, 1980 – Cable # 154469] – In Point 4, Secretary of State Muskie asks the US embassy about a proposal from two US members of Congress. The lawmakers note “the dangers inherent in trying to use our security relationship as leverage to moderate the tough line the generals are now pursuing.” They “wonder about the possibility of making, or at least considering, a change in our long-standing posture toward North Korea as a way of mounting leverage….[One lawmaker] was intrigued by the idea of telling Chun Doo Hwan that under certain circumstances we might find it necessary to review our long-standing refusal to talk to the North without the ROK present in order to protest our interests in the peninsula.” (In a later cable below, Gleysteen firmly rejects the proposal.)
6/12/1980 – This is Gleysteen’s response to Cable #154469 – “Consultations with Congress.” He asks Congress not to pass a resolution publicly critical of Chun Doo Hwan. He also rejects the lawmaker proposal on North Korea, saying, “I am extremely negative about [the] suggestion that we tell Chun Doo Hwan that in certain circumstances we might find it necessary to review our long standing refusal to talk to the North without the ROK present.”
6/12/1980 – Holbrooke briefs House members on Korea.
7/2/1980 – The cable includes instructions to Ambassador Gleysteen from the Secretary of State spelling out what he should say to General Chun Doo Hwan about American policy in Korea.
8/15/1980 – Instructions to Ambassador Gleysteen from Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher about an upcoming meeting with General Chun, primarily concerning Chun’s imminent rise to the presidency.
8/15/1980 – Further guidance from Christopher to Gleysteen on Chun’s imminent accession to the presidency.
All referenced documents available below in PDF format.
- Korea Focus | Consultations with Congress (1) | June 12, 1980
- Korea Focus | Consultations with Congress (2) | June 12, 1980
- Korea Focus | Instructions to See General Chun Beijing for Assistant Secretary Holbrooke | July 2, 1980
- New York Times Letter to the Editor on Kwangju | January 11, 1996
- Reuters Story on Tim Shorrock Document | January 23, 1996
